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B O R N  F R E E :  T O W A R D  A N  E X P A N S I V E
D E F I N I T I O N  O F  S E X
 aura alk* and helly runsted**
ABSTRACT
The State of New York recently issued its first physician-certi-
fied “intersex” birth certificate, correcting a 55-year-old’s original
birth certificate. This is a positive step towards eliminating the
traditional binary approach to a person’s birth sex, but it creates
potential uncertainties in the employment discrimination context.
Over the past several years, the definition of what constitutes “dis-
crimination on the basis of sex” has both expanded (with the legali-
zation of same-sex marriage) and narrowed (restricting the use of
gender specific bathrooms). Until recently it appeared that a broader
definition of the term “sex” would become the judicial—and possi-
bly legislative—norm in a variety of contexts. However, several ob-
stacles have emerged to jeopardize true equality for the LGBTQIA
community, including (1) inconsistent judicial opinions regarding
the meaning of “sex,” (2) the increased ability of employers to utilize
religion or “any other factor” as a defense to discrimination claims,
(3) regressive executive policies regarding the definition of “sex,” and
(4) uncertainty about the extent to which transgender individuals
may remain in the military. Although each of these issues warrants
thorough analysis and has sparked scholarly debate, in this Article
we focus on another critical inequality: wage disparity. Specifically,
we are concerned with the problem posed for DSD and transgender
individuals, given the Equal Pay Act’s requirement that plaintiffs
demonstrate they are paid differently from the “opposite sex” for a
wage disparity claim. The Equal Pay Act (EPA) is outdated and
discriminatory in its application, and it unnecessarily subjects an
entire segment of the workforce—LGBTQIA individuals—to con-
tinued discrimination. The EPA requires that plaintiffs prove their
cases through reference to an opposite sex comparator, but then defers
* Laura Palk is currently the Assistant Dean of Alumni and Development for the
University of Oklahoma College of Law and is a former University Title IX Officer,
Lecturer, Legal Studies and Accreditation and Assurance of Learning Coordinator at
the University of Oklahoma Price College of Business and Assistant Adjunct
Professor at the University of Oklahoma College of Law.
** Shelly Grunsted is an Assistant Professor of Legal Studies and the Executive Director
of the Center for Student Success at the University of Oklahoma Price College of
Business.
1
2 M I C H I G A N  J O U R N A L  O F  G E N D E R &  L A W [Vol. 25:1
to the employer’s subjective definition of who “the opposite sex” is.
This makes LGBTQIA plaintiffs’ cases essentially unwinnable. Un-
certainty for the LGBTQIA community is further compounded by
the expansion of the employer’s right, under both the Equal Pay Act
and Title VII, to invoke religion, conscience, or “any other factor” as
an affirmative defense to discrimination claims. In this Article, we
discuss the interplay between a plaintiff’s sex-specific protections
(against sex-based employment discrimination under Title VII and
against wage disparity under the Equal Pay Act) and an employer’s
affirmative defenses (under Title VII, the EPA, and current inter-
pretations of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act). Our discussion
concludes with recommendations for an expansive definition of the
word “sex” and the adoption of the recently proposed Equality Act to




I. WHAT DO LGBTQIA, TRANSGENDER AND
DSD MEAN? • 6
II. STATUTORY PROTECTIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION  INVOLVE THE DEFINITION OF
SEX • 10
A. The EPA: Outdated Comparators of “the
Opposite Sex” and Affirmative
Defenses • 12
B. State and Federal Agency Definitions of
“Sex” • 17
1. State-Level Discrepancies in Defining
“Sex” • 17
2. Federal-Level Discrepancies in Defining
“Sex” • 19
a. The Definition of “Sex” Under the
EPA • 20
b. The Definition of “Sex” Under Title
VII • 21
i. Sex Discrimination Based on
Transgender or DSD
Status • 24
2018] B O R N  F R E E :  T O W A R D  A N  E X P A N S I V E  D E F I N I T I O N  O F  S E X 3
ii. Sexual Orientation
Discrimination as a Form of
Sex Discrimination • 30
III. STATE ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS AND
PREEMPTION • 33
A. Preemption Issues • 33
B. Constitutional Protections Concerning Sex and
LGBTQIA Status as a Protected Class • 36
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTS TO
DISCRIMINATE • 41
A. An Employer’s First Amendment Right to
Discriminate • 42
1. Right to Free Exercise of
Religion • 42
2. Compelling Employers to Speak • 46
3. Compelling Association • 48
B. An Employer’s Statutory Right to
Discriminate • 49
1. Right to Discriminate Under Federal
RFRA • 49
2. Federal RFRA as a Defense in Purely
Private Litigation • 55
CONCLUSION • 57
INTRODUCTION
Despite antidiscrimination laws in the employment context, many
workers remain unprotected because courts have narrowly interpreted these
statutes’ use of the word “sex.” We explore how these laws unnecessarily
restrict a person’s right to equal employment and enable employers to use
anachronistic reasoning to disadvantage an entire population.
Most employment discrimination claims are brought under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).1 Specific claims of wage dis-
parity can also be brought under the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”), which requires
that plaintiffs prove additional elements beyond those required by Title
VII.2 In this Article, we address the EPA’s “opposite sex” requirement for
wage disparity relief, which we believe is outdated and discriminatory in its
application. The EPA requires that plaintiffs prove their cases through refer-
ence to an opposite sex comparator, but then defers to the employer’s
1. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-90).
2. 29 U.S.C.A. § 206 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-90).
4 M I C H I G A N  J O U R N A L  O F  G E N D E R &  L A W [Vol. 25:1
subjective definition of who is “the opposite sex.” This makes LGBTQIA
plaintiffs’ cases essentially unwinnable.
Recent interpretations of antidiscrimination laws and religious free-
dom laws have only exacerbated this issue. For example, the affirmative de-
fenses available to an employer under Title VII and the EPA—including an
employer’s right to use religion, conscience, or “any other factor”—and an
employer’s right to religious freedom under the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act (“RFRA”) have received expansive readings. This creates new ave-
nues for discrimination against LGBTQIA employees.
The State of New York recently issued its first physician-certified “in-
tersex” birth certificate, correcting a 55-year old’s original birth certificate.3
In doing so, New York has made a positive step toward eliminating the
traditional binary understanding of a person’s birth sex. But this step may
also create problems for LGBTQIA individuals attempting to bring claims
of sex discrimination and wage disparity. As a way of demonstrating the
potential for sex discrimination against DSD4 individuals, we will use the
New York birth certificate in the following hypothetical:
Sam is a DSD person who has both male and female genitalia, but
does not identify with either sex. Sam was born in New York and
benefits from the state’s changes to its birth certificate policy—Sam’s
birth certificate describes them as “intersex.” Sam is an adult. Sam is
hired at the Ward Photography studio, but is paid less than the other
employees, both males and females. Ward Photography has thirty
employees and is owned and operated by a husband and wife team.
3. See, e.g., Susan Scutti, “The Protocol of the Day Was to Lie”: NYC Issues First US
“Intersex” Birth Certificate, CNN, Jan. 2, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/30/
health/intersex-birth-certificate/index.html. The city issued a corrected birth certifi-
cate for Sara Kelly Keenan, certified by a physician who indicated that “non-binary”
was the appropriate umbrella term for gender variance. Id. Keenan was born with
male genes, female genitalia, and mixed internal reproductive organs. Id.
4. In this Article, when discussing the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, inter-
sex (DSD), and asexual community as a group, we will use the term “LGBTQIA”
and describe individuals as “they” or “them.” See Answers to Your Questions About
Individuals with Intersex Conditions, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (2006), https://www.apa
.org/topics/lgbt/intersex.pdf. Because many experts and persons with intersex condi-
tions indicate that the term “disorders of sex development or DSD” is the more
appropriate and less stigmatizing term than “intersex,” we will use it in this Article.
Id. Experts estimate that one in every 1,500 persons is born with genitals that cannot
be easily classified as either male or female. Id. Additionally, we use the terms “trans-
gender” and “DSD” in their broadest sense, recognizing that the terms have been
politicized and criticized for failing to adequately address the individual distinction
of each person’s experience and expression. Ido Katri, Transgender Intrasectionality:
Rethinking Anti-Discrimination Law and Litigation, 20 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE
51, 56–57 (2017).
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The owners are devoutly religious and live in a small town, where
they market their services to church groups in the local paper and on
local radio stations. Many of their clients are churches or members of
church congregations, all of whom believe that men can only marry
women, that same-sex intimacy is a sin, and that a person’s sex (and
gender) is the one which they were assigned at birth. Moreover, any
attempt to alter one’s gender designation from birth is a sin. Al-
though it is open to the public, the studio is selective in its hiring
practices, generally only hiring those individuals the couple person-
ally knows. In a move that differed from its usual practice, the studio
hired Sam based on Sam’s talented portfolio. The studio never
thought to inquire about Sam’s sex, and believed Sam to be male.
After Sam had worked at the studio for a year, entitling Sam to a
pay raise and other benefits, Sam disclosed that their birth certificate
reflects their sex as “intersex.” Sam then applied for the vacant man-
agerial position at the studio and sought a raise commensurate with
the men in managerial positions. The owners wished instead to ter-
minate Sam’s employment, believing Sam to be unable to further the
best interests and the mission of the studio. Sam is considering the
available legal options but is confronted with a bleak legal land-
scape: The EPA requires that they demonstrate they are being paid
less than a member of the “opposite sex,” and Title VII may not
include protections for a DSD person.5 Moreover, even if Sam is able
to demonstrate discrimination, the studio may have a religious or
constitutional defense allowing it to discriminate against Sam.
The hypothetical example above demonstrates the current opaqueness
of sex and gender discrimination. It also illustrates the need for continued
judicial consistency, legislative guidance, and the broadening of societal
norms to further equality in the workplace. In this Article, we examine the
potential conflicts between the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of the
definition of “sex” and its equally broad interpretation of employers’ relig-
ious freedoms to—we argue—discriminate against the LGBTQIA commu-
nity. We argue that the ambiguous language of RFRA (and the laws of
many states that mirror or expand RFRA) provides a potential defense for
employers in private litigation.
Transgender and DSD individuals are essentially excluded from chal-
lenging equal pay and sex-based discrimination laws because of two le-
gal developments: first, the courts’ overly-broad understanding of an
employer’s affirmative defenses and second, the statutes’ unnecessary and
5. See Answers to Your Questions About Individuals with Intersex Conditions, supra note 4.
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discriminatory definition of “sex.” Although several states have attempted to
combat this discrepancy in a way that would be favorable to the LGBTQIA
community,6 there is some concern that these state laws may be preempted
by both Title VII and the EPA. Officially recognizing the entirety of the
LGBTQIA community as a protected class (including protections against
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, trans-
gender, and DSD status) would resolve many of these issues. Such a step
would further national, social, and economic interests to have an inclusive
and efficient workforce, and would be in line with the majority opinion of
the U.S. population.7 Accordingly, to move towards this goal, we recom-
mend congressional support for the Equality Act or for other, greater statu-
tory protections for the LGBTQIA community.
I. WHAT DO LGBTQIA, TRANSGENDER AND DSD MEAN?
Our discussion regarding sex discrimination necessarily entails a dis-
cussion of the definitional and societal terms surrounding sex. We must
examine whether the term “sex” is synonymous with the term “gender” in a
variety of contexts, including the employment context. The Transgender
Law & Policy Institute defines “transgender” as “an umbrella term encom-
passing: pre-operative, post-operative, and non-operative transsexual people;
cross-dressers; feminine men and masculine women; and more generally,
anyone whose gender identity or expression differs from conventional ex-
pectations of masculinity or femininity.”8 Courts define “transgender” as an
individual “who identifies with or expresses a gender identity that differs
from the one which corresponds to the person’s sex at birth.”9
Although the terms “sex” and “gender” are often used interchangeably
by courts and in common parlance, a person’s birth sex, defined by their
genitalia, may be incongruent with a person’s gender, defined by the “atti-
tudes, feelings, and behaviors that a given culture associates with a person’s
6. See State Public Accommodation Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (July 13,
2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-public-accom-
modation-laws.aspx (identifying states in which anti-discrimination laws have been
passed).
7. See Alex Reed, Redressing LGBTQ Employment Discrimination Via Executive Order,
29 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 133, 134 (2015).
8. About Us, TRANSGENDER LAW & POLICY INST., www.transgenderlaw.org/about-
TLPE.htm (last visited Apr. 107, 2018). We use “their,” “they,” and “them” to avoid
the strict gender binary that comes with the use of “he/she,” “him/her,” and “his/
hers.”
9. See Lewis v. High Point Reg’l Health Sys., 79 F. Supp. 3d 588, 589 (E.D.N.C.
2015) (quoting the Merriam Webster Online Dictionary); Kaeo-Tomaselli v. Pi’ikoi
Recovery House for Women, No. CIV. 11-00670 LEK, 2011 WL 5572603, at *3
n.4 (D. Haw. Nov. 16, 2011).
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biological sex.”10 Even DSD or “intersex” individuals—those individuals
who have atypical genitals, genitals of both sexes, or no genitals (where
“genitals” can refer to internal reproductive organs, external genitalia, or
sex-related chromosomes)—are constrained by ideas surrounding sex-stere-
otyping and the definition of gender.11 Legal protection for a DSD person
could be restricted simply because the person does not fit within the binary
interpretation of “sex.”12
Understanding that gender identity is an immutable characteristic13 is
important for advancing legal protections for transgender and DSD individ-
uals. Because the Equality Act officially recognizes this fact, we believe it is a
significant next step.
Policies at both the federal and state levels have discriminated against
the LGBTQIA community. Some of this discriminatory legislation includes
the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy (prohibiting openly gay and
lesbian people from entering service),14 voting laws (prohibiting a trans-
gender person the right to vote when their identity documents do not
match their perceived sex),15 the Trump administration’s ban on allowing
transgender military enlistees,16 the exclusion of “transvestites” from the
10. See Am. Psychological Ass’n, Guidelines for Psychological Practice With Lesbian, Gay,
and Bisexual Clients, 67 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 10, 11 (2012), http://www.apa.org/
pubs/journals/features/amp-a0024659.pdf.
11. See Answers to Your Questions About Individuals with Intersex Conditions, supra note 4.
12. Historically, utilization of anatomical external genitalia and patterns of chromosomes
governed the categorization of a person’s assigned sex. However, these tests did not
account for chromosomal mutations, hormonal influences, and gender identities. See
M. Dru Levasseur, Gender Identity Defines Sex: Updating the Law to Reflect Modern
Medical Science is Key to Transgender Rights, 39 VT. L. REV. 943, 980–82 & n.214
(2015).
13. Id. at 980–82 & nn.214, 238 (detailing medical evidence that suggests brain func-
tion and hormonal influences, rather than genitalia, influence a person’s gender
identity).
14. Mary Kate Cannistra et al., A History of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”, WASH. POST, Nov.
30, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/don’t-ask-don’t-
tell-timeline/; Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Helene Cooper, Trump Says Transgender Peo-
ple Will Not Be Allowed in the Military, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2017, https://www
.nytimes.com/2017/07/26/us/politics/trump-transgender-military.html.
15. Jody L. Herman, Strict Voter ID Laws May Disenfranchise More than 34,000 Trans-
gender Voters in the 2016 November Election, WILLIAMS INST. (2016), http://william-
sinstitute.law.ucla.edu/research/strict-voter-id-laws-may-disenfranchise-more-than-
34000-transgender-voters-in-the-2016-november-election/.
16. Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Helene Cooper, Transgender People Can Still Serve for Now,
U.S. Military Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/
27/us/politics/transgender-military-trump-ban.html; Bryan Bender, Congress Advised
It Has Authority to Undo Any Transgender Military Ban, POLITICO, July 28, 2017,
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/07/28/trump-transgender-military-ban-cong
ress-can-undo-241093.
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protections of the Fair Housing Act,17 and the exclusion of individuals with
“transvestism, transsexualism and gender identity disorders not resulting
from physical impairments” from the protections of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.18 Various states (including inter alia Arkansas, North Caro-
lina, Mississippi, and Texas) have passed some form of legislation that dis-
criminates against LGBTQIA individuals.19 Notably, other states have
passed antidiscrimination laws protecting individuals from sexual orienta-
tion and gender identity discrimination.20
It can be particularly easy for courts to overlook the way discrimina-
tion affects different groups within the LGBTQIA community.21 The per-
vasiveness of discrimination against transgender and DSD persons in a
variety of contexts has been studied and recognized through a number of
judicial decisions and social science studies, including two national surveys,
the 2011 National Transgender Discrimination Survey and the 2015 United
States Transgender Survey.22 It is estimated that there are 5.4 million
17. Kevin M. Barry et al., A Bare Desire to Harm: Transgender People and the Equal
Protection Clause, 57 B.C. L. REV. 507, 527–29 (2016) (discussing whether trans-
gender status is an immutable trait). See also The Discrimination Administration:
Trump’s record of action against transgender people, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER
EQUAL., http://www.transequality.org/the-discrimination-administration (last visited
Apr. 17, 2018) (addressing Trump’s 100 days of action against transgender people
and various other negative government actions, including the Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development’s regulations and guidance regarding transgender
individuals).
18. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12211(b)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–90). The quoted
language utilizes outdated and offensive terminology regarding the LGBTQIA
community.
19. See generally Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based
Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L. J. 2516 (2015).
20. Kyle C. Velte, All Fall Down: A Comprehensive Approach to Defeating the Religious
Right’s Challenges to Antidiscrimination Statutes, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1, 21 (2016). See
also State Public Accommodation Laws supra note 6.
21. Elise Holtzman, “I Am Cait,” But It’s None of Your Business: The Problem of Invasive
Transgender Policies and a Fourth Amendment Solution, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1943,
1950–51 (2016) (citing Tyler Curry, Why Gay Rights and Trans Rights Should Be
Separated, HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 17, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
tyler-curry/gay-rights-and-transrights_b_4763380.html); Danielle Paquette, 8 criti-
cal facts about the state of transgender America, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2015, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2015/01/22/the-state-of-transgend
er-america-massive-discrimination-little-data/ (finding that 41% of transgender peo-
ple surveyed had attempted suicide—a much larger portion than the 1.6% of the
general population that had attempted suicide). See also Jaime M. Grant et al., Injus-
tice at Every Turn: A Report of the National Transgender Discrimination Survey (2011),
http://www.thetaskforce.org/static_html/downloads/reports/reports/ntds_full.pdf.
22. See WALTER O. BOCKTING ET AL., Stigma, Mental Health, and Resilience in an On-
line Sample of the US Transgender Population, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, 943, 946
(2013); Grant et al., supra note 21; S.E. James et. al., The Report of the 2015 U.S.
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LGBTQIA individuals in the United States workforce.23 These individuals
face significant discrimination in the workplace. According to the National
Transgender Discrimination Survey, 8–17% of the respondents who identi-
fied as lesbian, gay, and bisexual reported being terminated or not hired
because of their sexual orientation; by contrast, 47% of respondents who
identified as transgender reported being fired or not hired because of their
status.24 Similarly, 7–14% of lesbian, gay, and bisexual workers reported
being harassed by their co-workers; a shocking 78% of transgender workers
reported that they had experienced some type of mistreatment or
discrimination.25
The pay differentials that individuals in the LGBTQIA community
face are likewise troubling. The Williams Institute determined that gay and
bisexual men earn 10–32% less than similarly qualified heterosexual men.26
And while lesbian and bisexual women seem to earn at comparable rates to
heterosexual women (and sometimes more), all women are, on average, con-
tinuing to earn less than both heterosexual and gay men.27 Even more
troubling is the wage disparity for transgender women, who were found to
earn up to 1/3 less money than they had before they transitioned from male
to female.28 Interestingly, the same study found those workers who transi-
tioned from female to male saw slightly increased salaries after their transi-
tions.29 Thus, it is apparent that women, and transgender women in
particular, continue to lack equality in workplace earnings.30 Accordingly,
Transgender Survey, NATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY (2015),
https://transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/usts/USTS-Full-Report-Dec17.pdf.
See also Board of Education v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850, 874 (S.D.
Ohio 2016) (applying heightened scrutiny to transgender student’s challenge to
bathroom policies under the Equal Protection Clause); Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified
Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1050–51 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding
that a school policy prohibiting a student from using bathroom of their choosing
because they were transitioning may constitute a form of prohibited sex-stereotyping
under Title IX and heightened scrutiny applied to the student’s Equal Protection
claim).
23. MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., A BROKEN BARGAIN: DISCRIMINA-
TION, FEWER BENEFITS AND MORE TAXES FOR LGBT WORKERS 5 (2013), http://
www.lgbtmap.org/a-broken-bargain-full-report.
24. Grant et al., supra note 21, at 53.
25. Id. at 56. Notably, the survey does not address the DSD community in particular, so






30. The National Center for Transgender Equality also found transgender individuals
were four times more likely to live in extreme poverty—a household income of less
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we turn next to the mechanisms through which the LGBTQIA community
can seek relief from employment discrimination.
II. STATUTORY PROTECTIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
INVOLVE THE DEFINITION OF SEX
The extent to which the transgender community can seek employ-
ment redress remains uncertain, given the patchy (and sometimes inconsis-
tent) protections afforded by federal and state laws. At the federal level,
transgender and DSD plaintiffs can seek relief from employment discrimi-
nation under Title VII.31 Claims of wage disparity can also be brought
under the EPA, but it is unclear how the EPA applies to transgender and
DSD individuals, as discussed in II.B.2. Additionally, several states provide
potential causes of action through their own antidiscrimination and equal
pay laws, which are often more comprehensive than those available at the
federal level.32 Even so, at the core of any employment discrimination claim,
whether state or federal, will be the interpretation of “sex.”33
In an attempt to define “sex” for employment discrimination pur-
poses, courts have turned to the definition of the word as listed in the dic-
tionary at the time the statute was enacted.34 As a result, until very recently,
courts have interpreted the term sex as purely binary—male and female.35
Over the past 40 years, several attempts have been made to expand
employment protections for the LGBTQIA community, but each attempt
has been unsuccessful.36 In 2011, the most explicitly inclusive federal statute
than $10,000 per year—than the general population. See Grant et al., supra note 21,
at 2.f
31. Reed, supra note 7, at 134.
32. Compare id. at 163 n.172 (“Executive Order 11246 would prohibit federal contrac-
tors from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex (including gender
identity and sexual orientation), or national origin.”) with JEROME HUNT, A STATE-
BY-STATE EXAMINATION OF NONDISCRIMINATION LAWS AND POLICIES (2012),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/reports/2012/06/11/11696/a-state-by-
state-examination-of-nondiscrimination-laws-and-policies/ (summarizing state laws
and indicating California and New York as having some of the broadest legislation).
33. See HUNT, supra note 32 (summarizing state laws and ranking their protections for
employees; notably, state legislation speaks in terms of general statements of “sexual
orientation” and “gender identity” without specific guidance into the more specific
areas of discrimination experienced by the transgender and DSD community).
34. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 388 (2009).
35. Compare Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971) (finding that dissimilar treat-
ment between men and women is discrimination based on sex) and Etsitty v. Utah
Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2007) with Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty
Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 347 (7th Cir. 2017) (finding that Title VII protections should
apply to discrimination based on sexual orientation, not simply sex discrimination).
36. See Reed, supra note 7, at 134.
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for the LGBTQIA community, known as the Employment Non-Discrimi-
nation Act (“ENDA”), was proposed but not adopted.37 ENDA would have
resolved some of the issues presented by the term “sex” because it would
have prohibited “discrimination against individuals in employment based
on perceived or actual sexual orientation and gender identity, and retaliation
against them.”38
In 2017, the Equality Act—a sweeping antidiscrimination statute
originally from the 1970s—was re-introduced in both the U.S. Senate and
the House of Representatives.39 The Equality Act seeks to protect against
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in employ-
ment, housing, access to public places, federal funding, credit, education,
and jury service.40 If passed, the Equality Act would provide a broad base of
protections—broader even than those proposed by ENDA—by amending
existing statutes to expand protections on the basis of “sex” to include sexual
orientation, gender identity, pregnancy, childbirth (or a related medical
condition), and sex-based stereotypes.41 Even so, the Equality Act lacks spe-
cific inclusion of the transgender and DSD community, so it likely does not
go far enough.
Support for policies advanced by the Equality Act is growing, as evi-
denced by a poll of likely voters conducted by the Human Rights Campaign
(“HRC”), an influential LGBTQ civil rights and political advocacy group.42
The poll found that many likely voters desire to prevent discrimination
against the LGBTQ community.43 The poll also found that voters would be
37. Melissa Wasser, Legal Discrimination: Bridging the Title VII Gap for Transgender Em-
ployees, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1109, 1116 (2016) (discussing history of ENDA and the
Equality Act). See also Lisa Bornstein & Megan Bench, Married on Sunday, Fired on
Monday: Approaches to Federal LGBT Civil Rights Protections, 22 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 31, 34–35 (2015).
38. Wasser, supra note 37, at 1116.
39. Equality Act of 2017, S. 1006, 115th Cong. (2017) (referred to Senate Committee
on the Judiciary on May 2, 2017); see Jerome Hunt, A History of the Employment
Non-Discrimination Act, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (July 19, 2011), https://www.american
progress.org/issues/lgbt/news/2011/07/19/10006/a-history-of-the-employment-non-
discrimination-act/.
40. See Hunt, supra note 39.
41. S. 1006.
42. Human Rights Campaign uses the acronym “LGBTQ” to refer to the LGBTQIA
community. Accordingly, we use this acronym when discussing HRC’s work.
43. Press Release, Human Rights Campaign, New HRC Data: American Public Strongly
Supports Federal Non-Discrimination Protections (June 16, 2014), https://www.hrc
.org/press/new-hrc-data-american-public-strongly-supports-federal-non-discrimina
tion-p.
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less likely to support candidates who do not support the LGBTQ
community.44
The Human Rights Campaign also annually rates corporations on
their LGBTQ policies and work environments. Positive ratings by HRC
generate positive press for the companies, and lead some employers to have
more progressive policies than the law requires.45 92% percent of Fortune
500 companies have sexual orientation non-discrimination protections in
place, and most have gender identity protections as well.46 This is a hopeful
trend. Perhaps if enough corporations move towards inclusivity then legisla-
tors and legislation will follow.
Importantly, there is some evidence to suggest that the general public
erroneously believes that LGBTQIA discrimination is already illegal under
existing laws.47 Opponents of antidiscrimination legislation may harness
this misunderstanding to argue that LGBTQIA individuals are already pro-
tected under current case law.48 In fact, most state and federal laws fail to
offer even basic workplace protections to the LGBTQIA community, as
many states still permit employers to fire a person because they are gay or
transgender.49 Without clear congressional guidance and an explicit clarifi-
cation of what counts as “sex discrimination,” the community’s right to
equality remains precarious.
A. The EPA: Outdated Comparators of “the Opposite Sex”
and Affirmative Defenses
The EPA—which was designed to eliminate or reduce pay disparities
between the binary sexes—threatens to jeopardize transgender and DSD
equality. Like Title VII, the EPA was designed to combat discrimination
against women.50 The federal government enacted the EPA in 1963 after a
century of discussions about wage equality, thereby amending the Fair La-
bor Standards Act (“FLSA”).51
44. Id.
45. Id.; see also Shalyn L. Caulley, The Next Frontier to LGBT Equality: Securing Work-
place-Discrimination Protections, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 909, 916 (2017).
46. See Allison Turner, HRC Releases Annual Corporate Equality Index with Record 609
Companies Earning Perfect Scores, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, Nov. 9, 2017, https:/
/www.hrc.org/blog/hrc-releases-annual-corporate-equality-index-609-companies-
earn-perfect-sco.
47. See Caulley, supra note 45, at 919.
48. Id.
49. German Lopez, The Equality Act, the most comprehensive LGBTQ rights bill ever, ex-
plained, VOX, Nov. 10, 2015, https://www.vox.com/2015/7/23/9023611/equality-
act-lgbt-rights.
50. See generally County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
51. See Gunther, 452 U.S. at 174.
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To state an EPA claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she or he
received different compensation than a person of the “opposite sex” for
“equal work” on jobs, “the performance of which requires equal skill, effort,
and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working condi-
tions.”52 If the prima facie case is proven, the employer must show the pay
differential was made “pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system;
(iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production;
or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.”53 Moreover,
under the EPA, and unlike a disparate treatment claim under Title VII,
there is no requirement that the employer actually “intend” to
discriminate.54
Ultimately, the EPA prohibits pay differentials between employees
who perform “substantially similar work” unless the employer can claim one
of the four affirmative defenses.55 Even where the differences between the
two positions are inconsequential, an employer can successfully argue that
the pay differential was based on a “factor other than sex.”56 This is accom-
plished by comparing “the jobs held by the female and male employees, and
by showing that those jobs are substantially equal, not by comparing the
skills and qualifications of the individual employees holding those jobs.”57
The notion of “equal pay” for “equal work” might make a plaintiff’s case
52. See Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Shattering the Equal Pay Act’s Glass Ceiling, 63
S.M.U. L. REV. 17, 29–31 (2010) (discussing the requirements for a claim under the
Equal Pay Act). See also Elizabeth J. Wyman, The Unenforced Promise of Equal Pay
Acts: A National Problem and Possible Solution from Maine, 55 ME. L. REV. 23, 50
(2002); 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(d)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-90).
53. 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(d)(1).
54. Eisenberg, supra note 52, at 31.
55. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). See also Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975
F.2d 1518, 1532–34 (11th Cir. 1992) (denying motion for summary judgment on
the issue of whether the plaintiff’s job was substantially equal to that of a male
buyer).
56. E.g., Miranda, 975 F.2d at 1533
57. Miranda, 975 F.2d at 1533 (noting the male comparator employee must be at the
same establishment as the female plaintiff). The establishment requirement is nar-
rowly defined as a “physically separate place of business—not an enterprise which
may comprise of multiple establishments.” Wendi S. Lazar & Kerry C. Herman, The
State of Equal Pay in the 21st Century, 89 N.Y. St. B.J. 56, 56–57 (2017). And yet,
once the prima facie case has been made, courts allow for a comparison of the indi-
viduals in those jobs to support the pay differential. See id. Employers have little
incentive to correct the pay disparities in light of a plaintiff’s limited options for
correcting back-pay differentials. There is also a negative trend in the Seventh and
Eighth Circuits, where plaintiffs’ success rates were 24% and 39% respectively. Id. In
addition to private plaintiffs, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) may initiate EPA claims, but as Ms. Eisenberg noted, it failed to do so
from 2000–2009. Id. Since then, courts have continued to dismiss EPA claims for
procedural reasons or on comparator grounds. Id.
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more difficult as positions can easily be distinguished from one another.58
Although Equal Pay Act claims are very fact intensive, they are often de-
cided at the summary judgment stage.59
One of the most controversial affirmative defenses an employer has in
its arsenal is the ability to claim the wage disparity was based on a “factor
other than sex.” There is some Supreme Court guidance, albeit limited,
regarding what an employer must demonstrate to defend against an EPA
claim. In 1974, the Supreme Court interpreted the EPA in Corning Glass
Works v. Brennan to require that employers must have a “legitimate reason”
for a pay differential between men and women.60 Four years later, the Su-
preme Court applied Title VII (as it incorporates the EPA’s affirmative de-
fenses) to address whether an employer’s requirement that female employees
pay higher pension premiums than male employees (because females tend to
live longer) was really a proxy consideration for sex-based discrimination.61
The employer argued that their action was based on a “factor other than
sex,” i.e. longevity, but the Court concluded the employer’s analysis was in
fact based on the difference between the sexes.62 Accordingly, the Court
found the “other than sex” defense of the EPA was inapplicable in the Title
VII claim.63
58. Miranda, 975 F.2d at 1532 (finding certain jobs may be worth less to an employer
even though the jobs are mainly staffed by females). The EPA does not require equal
pay for “comparable work” or equal pay for “comparable worth.” To be “equal” the
jobs “must be virtually identical, that is, they would be very much alike or closely
related to each other.” Waters v. Turner, Wood & Smith Ins. Agency, Inc., 874 F.2d
797, 799 (11th Cir. 1989). The positions need not be absolutely identical but, in
practice, courts look for something extremely close to identical. Id. Where the differ-
ences are inconsequential, an employer may still overcome an EPA violation by
showing that a factor other than sex played a role, e.g. the male comparators in the
similar job had better experience, pay history, etc. Cochran v. Alabama Power Co.,
2017 WL 2223038 at *6 (S.D. Ala. 2017). When employees rise to higher ranks, it
becomes increasingly difficult to find appropriate comparators. See e.g. E.E.O.C. v.
Port Auth., 768 F.3d 247, 258 (2d Cir. 2014) (attorneys did not perform equal
work); Carey v. Foley & Lardner LLP, 577 F. App’x 573, 580 (6th Cir. 2014)
(partners in law firm did not perform equal work).
59. See Eisenberg, supra note 52, at 41.
60. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 191 n.3 (1974). The men in Bren-
nan demanded higher salaries to perform what they considered “women’s work.” Id.
However, where working conditions are in fact different, pay differentials can be
“legitimate.” Id. at 201.
61. City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707–08
(1978) (analyzing the case under Title VII, which incorporates the EPA’s affirmative
defenses).
62. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 711–12.
63. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 711–12.
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More recently, the Supreme Court examined an age discrimination
case under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), which
has a somewhat similar affirmative defense to the EPA’s “other than sex”
defense.64 The ADEA denies a plaintiff recovery if the employer can show
that “reasonable factors other than age” led to the adverse action.65 Because
the EPA and the ADEA share a potentially similar affirmative defense, the
plurality opinion in the ADEA case noted that the EPA allows a pay differ-
ential “on any other factor – reasonable or unreasonable,” (emphasis added)
as long as it is not based on sex.66 In this regard, the Supreme Court’s dicta
suggests the Court would not require an employer to demonstrate that its
reason for pay disparity furthered a reasonable business decision.67 The rea-
sonableness analysis could prove influential with respect to the identical af-
firmative defense under the EPA because it is a similar “catch-all” category.
Without an obligation to demonstrate that the employer’s justification for
the pay disparity is reasonable, the defense allows an employer to fabricate a
reason and withstand legal action by a member of the LGBTQIA commu-
nity. For example, in Rizo v. Yovino, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
recently rejected a district court’s opinion that pay disparities cannot be
based solely on salary history.68 The Ninth Circuit determined that the
EPA’s affirmative defense of a “factor other than sex” meant that an em-
ployer could set pay rates based on prior salaries, so long as doing so fur-
thered a business policy and was reasonable.69
The controversy over this affirmative defense arises when employers
examine the pay history of their employees and determine pay rates accord-
ingly.70 Facially, one might argue that resulting pay differentials are due to a
64. See Smith v. Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 239 n.11 (2005) (plurality opinion); Deborah
L. Brake, Reviving Paycheck Fairness: Why and How the Factor-other-than-Sex Defense
Matters 52 Idaho L. Rev. 889, 895–96 (“The plurality [in Smith] contrasted the
language in the EPA’s FOTS defense with the language in the [ADEA’s] RFOA,
which permits an employment practice that is ‘otherwise prohibited’ under the
ADEA if it was based on ‘reasonable factors other than age’ (RFOA).”).
65. Brake, supra note 64, at 895.
66. Smith, 544 U.S. at 239 n.11.
67. Brake, supra note 64 at 896–98, nn.43–55 (noting the Seventh and Eighth Circuits’
conclusion that the “factor other than sex” does not require anything other than the
reason be gender-neutral, as opposed to the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, which require
a sufficient business justification be part of the defense).
68. Rizo v. Yovino, 854 F.3d 1161, 1166 (9th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, 869 F.3d
1004 (9th Cir. 2017) and on reh’g en banc, No. 16-15372, 2018 WL 1702982 (9th
Cir. Apr. 9, 2018).
69. Rizo, 854 F.3d at 1166.
70. Deborah L. Brake, The Shifting Sands of Employment Discrimination: From Unjusti-
fied Impact to Disparate Treatment in Pregnancy and Pay, 105 Geo. L.J. 559, 604
(2017).
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factor other than sex. But one has to acknowledge that women and trans-
gender people have historically been paid less than heterosexual men as a
result of discrimination.71 Accordingly, if a woman’s pay history is less than
a man’s pay history, then using it to set current pay rates will perpetuate the
pay disparity cycle.72 Likewise, as LGBTQIA community members tradi-
tionally have received lower wages than heterosexual workers, their pay his-
tories will continue to subject them to pay disparity discrimination.73 In this
way, pay differentials that are created as a result of unequal pay histories are
still based on sex.
Circuits are split on the issue of whether pay history alone can support
a wage disparity claim. The Tenth and Eleventh Circuit Courts have held
that salary history cannot be the sole basis for determining compensation
under the EPA; the Seventh and Eighth Circuit Courts have permitted the
practice.74 The Ninth Circuit has agreed to review its recent ruling in Rizo
that an employer must have a legitimate reason for its business decision to
pay women less than men.75
Many legal scholars have discussed the weaknesses in the EPA and
have recommended changes to resolve these issues.76 Continuing to allow
the EPA’s outdated definition of sex and overly-broad interpretation of the
business legitimacy requirement will continue to limit the LGBTQIA com-
munity’s possible avenues of recourse.
Below we will examine the term “sex” in the context of state laws
regarding driver’s licenses and birth certificates and how this might affect a




74. Brake, supra note 64, at 896–99.
75. Rizo v. Yovino, 854 F.3d 1161, 1166 (9th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, 869 F.3d
1004 (9th Cir. 2017) and on reh’g en banc, No. 16-15372, 2018 WL 1702982 (9th
Cir. Apr. 9, 2018). See also EEOC, Directives Transmittal No. 915.003,
§ 10.IV.F.2. (Dec. 5, 2000), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation_pro
cedures.html (“An employer . . . must show that the factor is related to job require-
ments or otherwise is beneficial to the employer’s business [and] the factor must be
used reasonably in light of the employer’s stated business purpose as well as its other
practices.”).
76. See Brake, supra note at 64, at 604–05. The Paycheck Fairness Act, which would
help to resolve the EPA’s inequities, has failed to pass both houses of Congress over
the years. Brake, supra note 70, at 909 n.119-20 (collecting arguments). President
Trump rescinded the prior administration’s Executive Order prohibiting federal con-
tractors from discriminating based on gender identity and sexual orientation. Robert
G. Lian, Jr., Daniel L. Nash & Andrew R. Turnbull, President Trump Rescinds the
Blacklisting Executive Order, Mar. 28, 2017, https://www.akingump.com/en/experi
ence/practices/corporate/ag-deal-diary/president-trump-rescinds-the-blacklisting-ex-
ecutive-order-1.html.
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the word’s meaning within certain federal statutes and constitutional provi-
sions affecting employment.
B. State and Federal Agency Definitions of “Sex”
The legal meaning of the word “sex” swings with the political pendu-
lum. Under the Obama administration, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR),
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) began broadening the definition of “sex” in a variety
of legal circumstances.77 However, President Trump’s 2017 pronouncement
that transgender persons are to be excluded from the military, and the re-
cent rescission of OCR’s 2016 proclamation (which allowed transgender
individuals the right to choose which bathroom they used) have narrowed
the protections afforded on the basis of “sex.”78 A clear and final definition
of “sex” is necessary.79
1. State-Level Discrepancies in Defining “Sex”
Clarifying “sex” is particularly important for employment law. To be
legally employed a person must provide their employer with a valid Social
Security card or passport.80 If either of those documents is unavailable, they
must present a birth certificate so that their employer can complete a federal
I-9 Employment Eligibility Verification Form.81 A birth certificate is also
often required for a person to obtain other personal identification docu-
ments, such as a Social Security card, passport, or driver’s license.82
77. Alexandra A. Klimko, Comment: Transgender Employment Discrimination Equality in
Wisconsin: The Demise of a Former LGBTIQ+ Rights Trailblazer, 18 Marq. Benefits &
Soc. Welfare L. Rev. 163, 170 (2016); Alexandra A. Harriman, Putting the Restroom
Debate to Rest: Addressing Title IX and Equal Protection in G.G. Ex. Rel. Grimm v.
Gloucester County School Board, 69 Me. L. Rev. 273, 278-79, 282-83 (2017).
78. Davis & Cooper, supra note 14; Jeremy W. Peters et al., Trump Rescinds Rules on
Bathrooms for Transgender Students, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2017, https://www.nytimes
.com/2017/02/22/us/politics/devos-sessions-transgender-students-rights.html.
79. See Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017) (vacat-
ing and remanding the appellate court’s ruling, as federal guidance interpreting “sex”
had been withdrawn); see also G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Glouster Cty. Sch. Bd., 822
F.3d 709, 709–27 (4th Cir. 2016) (outlining the underlying claims and arguments).
80. See Lisa Mottet, Modernizing State Vital Statistics Statutes and Policies to Ensure Accu-
rate Gender Markers on Birth Certificates: A Good Government Approach to Recognizing
the Lives of Transgender People, 19 MICH J. OF GENDER & L. 373, 393-94 (2013).
81. See id. at 393 n.42 (2013) (explaining gender expression); Nate Silver, Change
Doesn’t Usually Come This Fast, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT, June 26, 2015, http://fivethirty
eight.com/datalab/change-doesnt-usually-come-this-fast/ (discussing the definitions
of sex, legal sex, gender, and how one might identify as transgender).
82. Mottet, supra note 80, at 391.
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How a person amends these identification documents varies depend-
ing on their state of residence, and whether the issuing agency is a state or
federal agency.83 Some states’ requirements for alteration of identification
documents are not particularly burdensome.84 However, other states require
proof of sex reassignment surgery before a person’s listed gender can be
altered from the one noted on official identification.85 Obtaining the medi-
cal and legal prerequisites to alter one’s identification documents can be
expensive.86 States that require proof of active gender transitioning deprive
those who cannot afford the procedures or who otherwise choose to not
undergo medical treatment of the legal protection they deserve.87
There is little clarity in the different state standards for identifying or
changing one’s official “sex.” Complying with these various standards of
“sex” is only one barrier for transgender and DSD individuals. These incon-
sistencies make proving—or even articulating—a prima facie case of wage
discrimination especially complex.88
Overlaid on state definitions and requirements, the federal govern-
ment has its own restrictions on when and how a person can alter their
gender designation, as discussed below.89 When applying for jobs, or other
governmental services, how a person identifies their sex or gender may be at
odds with the definitions propounded by various state and federal agencies.
83. The federal government requires medical certification that the person is undergoing
appropriate medical treatment whereas some states require a court order. See Doran
Shemin, My Body Is My Temple: Utilizing the Concept of Dignity In Supreme Court
Jurisprudence To Fight Sex Reassignment Surgery Requirements For Recognition of Legal
Sex, 24 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L., 491, 496 (2016). Yet, other states
require certification that a person has actually undergone the surgery, and others
prohibit any amendments to birth certificates under any circumstances. Id. at
496–97.
84. Id. at 493 n.10 (“Residents of Michigan can now use a U. S. Passport to receive an
updated Michigan ID.”).
85. See, e.g., Love v. Johnson, No. 15-11834, 2016 WL 4437667, at *1, 4 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 23, 2016) (asserting that state amended its prior restrictive policy on altering
one’s gender on their birth certificate, allowing the use of a U.S. passport instead,
which has slightly less restrictive standards regarding when a person is considered to
be in transition and qualifies for gender reassignment documentation).
86. Holtzman, supra note 21, at 1967.
87. See Mottet, supra note 80, at 405, 407–09 (noting that many individuals opt not to
undergo treatment based on a lack of desire for medical treatment and cost).
88. Flaherty v. Massapequa Pub. Sch., 752 F. Supp. 2d 286, 289. But see Hinton v. Va.
Union Univ., 185 F. Supp. 3d 807, 842 (E.D. Va. 2016), motion to certify appeal
denied, No. 3:15CV569, 2016 WL 3922053 (E.D. Va. July 20, 2016) (finding
openly gay male administrative assistant stated a prima facie Equal Pay Act claim
because he was paid less than female colleagues for the same work).
89. See e.g., Gender Designation Change, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE – BUREAU OF CONSULAR
AFFAIRS, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/passports/apply-renew-passport/
gender.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2018).
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These inconsistencies make the process of completing standard employment
documentation especially difficult for DSD individuals.
2. Federal-Level Discrepancies in Defining “Sex”
At the core of a federal sex discrimination claim is the protection af-
forded on the basis of “sex.” As previously discussed, the two primary ave-
nues of federal relief for sex discrimination in the employment context are
through Title VII and the EPA. Where case law is lacking in one, courts
may look to the other statute for guidance.
Sex discrimination in compensation is prohibited by both Title VII
and the EPA.90 In 2014, the EEOC estimated approximately 30% of the
complaints it received were related to sex discrimination.91 The EEOC has
interpreted Title VII to include transgender individuals, and it views issues
surrounding gender identity and sexual orientation as sex-based discrimina-
tion.92 Although the EEOC is charged with enforcing Title VII and the
EPA, courts view its interpretations as persuasive, rather than binding.93 (If
the EEOC’s opinions were binding, appellate courts would be required to
adopt the agency’s interpretation absent proof that the ruling was “arbitrary
and capricious.”94) Accordingly, the EEOC’s pre-Trump administrative pol-
icy has limited persuasiveness and does not provide legal precedent. Like-
wise, this Article contends, the Supreme Court has provided no clarity on
what the term “sex” entails with respect to the LGBTQIA community.
90. Brake, supra note 70, at 601–602 (2017); see Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009). The Fair Pay Act (“FPA”) amended Title
VII as follows: “[A]n unlawful employment practice occurs, with respect to discrimi-
nation in compensation in violation of this title, when a discriminatory compensa-
tion decision or other practice is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to a
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or when an individual is
affected by application of a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice,
including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is paid, resulting in
whole or in part from such a decision or other practice.” Id. at 5–6.
91. U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Commission, Women in the American Workforce,
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/reports/american_experiences/women.cfm (last visited
Apr. 17, 2018).
92. Roberts v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 312 F.R.D. 594, 605 (D. Nev. 2016).
93. Tessa M. Register, Note, The Case for Deferring to the EEOC’s Interpretation in Macy
and Foxx to Classify LGBT Discrimination as Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 102
IOWA L. REV. 1397, 1400-08 (2017) (discussing varying degrees of deference af-
forded to agency interpretations and arguing the EEOC’s interpretation regarding
sex should carry great weight). See also Darrell Parker & Debra Burke, From Hot to
Lukewarm: Union Strength and Worker Rights, 44 W. ST. U. L. REV. 29, 37–38
(2016).
94. Register, supra note 93, at 37–38.
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To determine what Congress meant by certain key words, such as
“sex,” courts often begin by examining dictionaries.95 Dictionaries, in turn,
add or modify words by “scour[ing] the texts in search of new words, new
usages of existing words, variant spellings . . . anything that might help . . .
[to understand] what [the word] means.”96 When citing the dictionary’s
definition, courts have focused on language that that reinforces the binary
idea of sex.97 Most have determined that the word “sex” is separate and
distinct from the word “gender,” and as such, gender identity is not pro-
tected within Title VII’s prohibition on “sex discrimination.”98
a. The Definition of “Sex” Under the EPA
The case law under the EPA is inconsistent, but it is largely not
favorable to DSD plaintiffs.
One outlier court has recognized that a transgender person who has
undergone surgery has standing to sue for wage disparity under the EPA. In
Cummings v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority, a district court in
Ohio determined that a plaintiff who was born a male (but had undergone
sex reassignment surgery) was anatomically a female and therefore had
standing to sue under the EPA.99 The plaintiff had previously amended her
birth certificate to reflect that she was a female.100 The defendant employer
argued that because gender is assigned at birth, a person cannot later change
the designation.101 The court concluded that the plaintiff’s birth certificate
was to be given the full faith and credit of the Constitution, and as such, the
plaintiff was a female and had standing to sue under state equal pay laws,
gender discrimination laws, and Equal Protection laws.102
95. Adam Liptak, Justices Turning More Frequently to Dictionary, and Not Just for Big
Words, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/14/us/14bar
.html.
96. How Does a Word get into a Merriam-Webster Dictionary?, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/help/faq-words-into-dictionary (last visited Apr.
17, 2018).
97. Fabian v. Hosp. of Cent. Conn., 172 F. Supp. 3d 509, 524–26 (D. Conn. 2016).
98. Fabian, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 518.
99. Cummings v. Greater Cleveland Reg’l Transit Auth., 88 F. Supp. 3d 812, 816 (N.D.
Ohio 2015).
100. Cummings, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 815.
101. Cummings, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 816.
102. Cummings, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 816. The parties reached a settlement which plaintiff
has challenged based on mutual mistake of the parties regarding whether the settle-
ment would count toward her earnable salary equating to the 30 years of service she
would need for retirement purposes with the defendant. Cummings v. Greater
Cleveland Reg’l Transit Auth., No. 1:14-CV-01729, 2016 WL 6593857, at *2
(N.D. Ohio Nov. 8, 2016).
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The Ohio district court’s decision is a step forward, but it still only
protects those individuals who have actually undergone transitions; it would
not protect other members of the transgender or DSD community who
have opted not to undergo significant medical procedures.
Consider our initial hypothetical and the protections afforded by the
EPA: Sam was issued an intersex birth certificate by the state of New York.
It must be given the full faith and credit of the United States Constitution.
Viewed in the most progressive light, Sam should be able to allege that every
non-DSD person is a proper comparator for the opposite sex under the EPA
(because the DSD person is not categorized in a binary sense). To the extent
that another employee holds the same position as Sam and is not a DSD
person, that employee would be a proper comparator, regardless of if that
person is male, female, or transgender. Unless there is a nondiscriminatory
reason for the pay disparity, Sam should have standing to raise a prima facie
EPA claim. Unfortunately, under current judicial interpretations, it is more
likely that Sam, as a DSD person, will be unable to demonstrate that any
non-DSD employee is a compactor of the “opposite sex.” And because Sam
has not had a sex reassignment surgery like the one at issue in Cummings,
they are not likely to benefit from the Ohio court’s reasoning. A court
would be more likely to dismiss Sam’s claim for lack of standing.
b. The Definition of “Sex” under Title VII
Because of Sam’s likely inability to demonstrate an opposite sex com-
parator under the EPA, we turn to Title VII and the viability of Sam’s sex
discrimination claim. Title VII protects against adverse employment ac-
tions, including unfair compensation terms, but unlike the EPA, it does not
mandate an opposite sex comparator.103 The DSD plaintiff might assume
that Title VII is a good avenue of relief; however, as discussed below, it is
unclear whether a person’s status as DSD is protected by Title VII.
Regarding Title VII sex discrimination claims, courts struggle with the
breadth of adverse actions; courts disagree about whether protection from
sex discrimination also includes protection based on a person’s gender iden-
tification, gender stereotyping (i.e. males not behaving in a masculine man-
ner), transgender status, and sexual orientation.  Moreover, even where a
court might find an action to be sex discrimination, Title VII’s incorpora-
tion of the EPA’s affirmative defenses, including the “factor other than sex”
defense, is a significant hurdle in any Title VII case.104 Title VII prohibits an
employer from failing or refusing:
103. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-90); 29 U.S.C.
§ 206 (1963).
104. See supra Section II.A for more on the EPA’s affirmative defenses.
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(1). . . to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his status as an employee, because of such individ-
ual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.105
Plaintiffs can demonstrate unlawful discrimination under Title VII in
two ways: through “direct” evidence under a “mixed motives” theory of
liability (e.g. employer explicitly states it is firing a woman because she is a
woman) or through circumstantial evidence under the McDonnell Douglas
“burden shifting” framework.106 To establish “direct” evidence of discrimi-
nation, a plaintiff who is a member of a protected class must provide direct
or indirect evidence of intentional discrimination (e.g., through statements
or actions) resulting in an adverse employment action.107 Because this is a
high bar, the more common method of proof is under the McDonnell Doug-
las burden shifting framework, in which the plaintiff demonstrates a prima
facie case of discrimination by showing that “(1) she was within the pro-
tected class; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she was subject to an
adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action occurred under cir-
cumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.”108 If the plaintiff
meets her burden, the defendant must “articulate some legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.” The plaintiff then will be
required “to show that petitioner’s [employer’s] stated reason for respon-
dent’s rejection was in fact pretext.”109
105. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a), as amended by Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-
166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). Under Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate that sex
was a motivating factor in the adverse action. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar,
133 S. Ct. 2517, 2522–23 (2013).
106. Hawthorne v. Mercer Cty. Children & Youth Services, P. 147381 CCH, 2007 WL
9436343 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2007).
107. E.g., Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., 354 F.3d 277, 284 (4th Cir. 2004),
abrogated on other grounds by Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2532; see also Foster v. Univ. of
Md. E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 249 (4th Cir. 2015) (recognizing abrogation).
108. Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 584 F.3d 487, 498 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating the frame-
work as adopted in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03
(1973)).
109. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804.
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Even though Title VII’s protection against sex discrimination has been
around since 1964, the definition of “sex” remains controversial.110 The in-
tent of Title VII was to ensure women were treated the same as men in
employment.111 It seems obvious today that any discrimination against a
woman based on her pregnancy qualifies as sex discrimination; however,
this has not always been the case.  For example, in General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert, the Supreme Court determined that discrimination based on preg-
nancy was not sex discrimination under Title VII because the disparity in
paying for certain types of disability-related benefits and not others, includ-
ing pregnancy, was a pure business decision and had nothing to do with
sex.112 Congress later rectified the issue through the Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act and amendments to Title VII, which clarified that adverse actions
taken based on an employee’s pregnancy-related status qualified as sex dis-
crimination.113 Likewise, whether sex discrimination protections reach sta-
tus-based sex discrimination requires clarity and legislative action.
Title VII requires the individual be part of a protected class in order to
obtain relief.  In Connecticut v. Teal, the Supreme Court explained that Title
VII protects the individual member of the class—even in cases where the
employer generally treats members of the individual’s protected class fairly.114
In Teal, employees were required to pass a particular test in order to main-
tain supervisory status.115 Although 54% of black employees passed the test,
110. For a thorough discussion of Title VII and gender identity discrimination in the
workplace, see Leora F. Eisenstadt, Fluid Identity Discrimination, 52 AM. BUS. L.J.
789 (2015).
111. See, e.g., Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977)
(“[The 1972 Amendments to Title VII were] to remedy the economic deprivation of
women as a class.”); Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1251–52 (8th Cir.
1975) (referring to the legislative history and employment discrimination against
women); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1090 (5th Cir.
1973) (“We find the legislative history inconclusive at best and draw but one conclu-
sion, and that by way of negative inference. Without more extensive consideration,
Congress in all probability did not intend for its proscription of sexual discrimina-
tion to have significant and sweeping implications. We should not therefore extend
the coverage of the Act to situations of questionable application without some
stronger Congressional mandate.”).
112. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 138–40 (1976) (holding that even though
pregnancy-related disabilities only occur in females, non-pregnancy-related disability
coverage applied to all non-pregnant employees, whether male or female), superseded
by statute, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(k) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-90).
113. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(k).
114. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 455 (1982) (“It is clear that Congress never
intended to give an employer license to discriminate against some employees on the
basis of race or sex merely because he favorably treats other members of the employ-
ees’ group.”).
115. Teal, 457 U.S. at 443.
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the plaintiff employees, also black, did not pass, and were excluded from
promotional consideration.116 They contended that although a bottom-line
analysis showed more black employees received a promotion than white em-
ployees, they were excluded based on their race from an opportunity to
compete equally with white employees.117 The Supreme Court explained
that in a Title VII case, the issue is whether the employer mistreats the
individual because of the protected classification, not whether the protected
class as a whole is well-treated.118 This analysis is helpful, but for an individ-
ual within the LGBTQIA community to benefit from this analysis they
must be considered part of a “protected class,” which is not yet the case.
Accordingly, a DSD individual’s ability to bring a claim is severely con-
strained, if feasible at all.
i. Sex Discrimination based on Transgender or DSD Status
In the context of Title VII, several courts agree that transgender dis-
crimination is discrimination based on sex, and therefore qualifies as a pro-
tected class.119 However, not all courts have reached the same conclusion.120
Many courts continue to limit Title VII’s protection to simply prohibit sex-
stereotyping, i.e. a man is not masculine enough or a woman is not femi-
nine enough.121 Under this approach a DSD or transgender person cannot
116. Teal, 457 U.S. at 443–44.
117. Teal, 457 U.S. at 444.
118. Teal, 457 U.S. at 453–54.
119. See, e.g., Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, L.L.C., 641 F. App’x 883, 885 (11th
Cir. 2016) (finding pretext that transgender discrimination—based on the person’s
status as a transgendered person—would be sex discrimination under Title VII);
Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546
U.S. 1003 (2005) (finding a transgender person’s claim of Title VII discrimination
was sufficient to survive summary judgment because of sex-stereotyping); Schwenk
v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201–03 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Title VII encompasses both
sex—that is, the biological differences between men and women—and gender.”).
120. See Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1224–25 (10th Cir. 2007) (find-
ing the vast majority of federal courts have concluded that transgender discrimina-
tion based on the person’s status is not sex discrimination under Title VII, and
holding that termination for using the “wrong” restroom is a legitimate nondiscrimi-
natory reason for termination); Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081,
1086–1087 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that the term “sex” as it is used in Title VII
only refers to a biological male and biological female and does not protect sexual
identity).
121. See Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1041 (8th Cir. 2010)
(holding that a hotel desk employee who was terminated for lacking a pretty, “Mid-
western girl” appearance established pretext for sex discrimination); Chadwick v.
WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 45 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that sex discrimination
occurs when an employer believes that a woman, because she is a woman, will neg-
lect her job in favor of her childcare responsibilities).
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allege discrimination based on their status as DSD or transgender, but must
instead allege sex-based stereotyping.
Lower court interpretations on both sides of this topic are based on
the watershed case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
kins was the first Supreme Court case to address sex-based characteristics
outside the context of gender roles.122 In Price Waterhouse, the Court held
that Title VII protects people from discrimination “because of . . . sex” and
that failing to promote a female accountant to a managerial role simply
because she did not conform to the partnership’s idea of how women
should look, act, and dress was a prohibited form of sex discrimination and
sex-stereotyping.123
Since then, courts have reached varied conclusions about whether the
“because of . . . sex” prohibition applies to transgender individuals, or to
issues surrounding gender identity, gender expression, and sexual orienta-
tion.124 Generally, those cases finding in a plaintiff’s favor rely on the
Court’s expansive language in Price Waterhouse, which prohibited employers
from taking an action because the employee did not behave like a man or
woman “should” behave.125 Some of these cases have stated that a person’s
transgender status is necessarily part of their sex or gender identity, rather
than a separate or unique issue.126 Because gender status is a part of a per-
son’s identity, when an employer treats a DSD employee differently from
non-DSD employees, the treatment is because of the employee’s failure to
conform to their birth sex.127 In this way discrimination against a DSD
employee because of their status—rather than because of their failure to
behave in a manner the employer expects—is inherently a form of gender-
stereotyping.
122. See Bonnie L. Roach, Gender Stereotyping: The Evolution of Legal Protections for Gen-
der Nonconformance, 12 ATLANTIC L.J. 125, 131 (2010).
123. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989).
124. See E.E.O.C. v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d at 840
(discussing conflicting opinions on this topic). See generally Jessica A. Clarke, Fron-
tiers of Sex Discrimination Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 809 (2017) (compiling cases).
125. See Clarke, supra note 124; EEOC v. Scott Med. Health Ctr., 217 F. Supp. 3d 834,
840 (W.D. Pa. 2016); Winstead v. Lafayette Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’r, 197 F. Supp.
3d 1334, 1345 (N.D. Fla. 2016).
126. See, e.g., Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 738 (6th Cir. 2016), cert.
denied, 546 U.S. 1003 (2005) (affirming Title VII judgment for a transgender
woman who was denied a promotion because of the perception that she was a man
with an “ambiguous sexuality” whose behavior was “not sufficiently masculine,” in-
cluding “dressing as a woman outside of work”); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp.
2d 293, 306–08 (D. D.C. 2008) (sex discrimination includes adverse treatment be-
cause of a person’s gender transition).
127. See Am. Psychological Ass’n, Guidelines for Psychological Practice with Transgender and
Gender Nonconforming People, 70 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 832, 862–23 (2015).
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In Fabian v. Hospital of Central Connecticut, the Sixth Circuit consid-
ered whether failing to hire a transgender woman was grounds for a Title
VII and state law claim of sex discrimination.128 The court determined that
discrimination based on transgender identity was a form of gender-stere-
otyping protected by Price Waterhouse.129 The court then noted that when
courts limit the meaning of “sex” to mean male or female, they do so with-
out real regard for the Supreme Court’s language in Price Waterhouse: ac-
tions taken “because of sex” are sex discrimination.130 The Fabian court
stated:
Discrimination ‘because of sex,’ therefore, is not only discrimi-
nation because of maleness and discrimination because of
femaleness, but also discrimination because of the distinction be-
tween male and female or discrimination because of the proper-
ties or characteristics by which individuals may be classified as
male or female.131
The Fabian court examined contemporaneous and historically signifi-
cant dictionary terms that defined the term “sex” as “the sum of the mor-
phological, physiological, and behavioral peculiarities of living beings that
subserves biparental reproduction . . . and that is typically manifested as
maleness and femaleness. . . .”132 Based on these definitions, the court found
the term “sex” is more “than discrimination against women because they are
women and discrimination against men because they are men—it would
surely include discrimination on the basis of gender stereotypes, and just as
surely discrimination on the basis of gender identity. . . .”133 Narrow inter-
pretations of the word “sex” are unwarranted and prove problematic for an
effective workforce.
Nonetheless, the issue of whether a transgender individual’s status is
considered a protected class is unclear. Definitive protection for the
LGBTQIA community needs to be established. Specifically, a DSD person
may have a more difficult case to prove than a transgender person, as courts
have historically held that DSD individuals have no discrimination protec-
tion under Title VII.134
128. Fabian v. Hosp. of Cent. Connecticut, 172 F. Supp. 3d 509, 518 (D. Conn. 2016).
129. Fabian, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 527.
130. Fabian, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 526.
131. Fabian, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 526.
132. Fabian, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 526.
133. Fabian, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 527 (citing Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821,
822 (N.D. Ill. 1983), rev’d, 742 F.2d (7th Cir. 1984)).
134. E.g., Wood v. C.G. Studios, 660 F. Supp. 176, 177–78 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (finding a
person born with a “hermaphroditic condition” unable to bring a sex discrimination
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The current, conflicting standards around sex discrimination continue
to marginalize the DSD population.135 Most judicial interpretations unnec-
essarily categorize individuals as “men,” or “women,” or “transgender.” In-
stead of this narrow interpretation of gender and the behaviors associated
therewith, courts should focus on an employer’s reaction to the person and
their gender-based characteristics.136 The difficulties with the current ratio-
nales are well-articulated by a Louisiana district court:
This is not a matter of an employee of one sex exhibiting charac-
teristics associated with the opposite sex. This is a matter of a
person of one sex assuming the role of a person of the opposite
sex.137
One recent case, EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, demon-
strates one court’s struggle with the nuances of sexual orientation and gen-
der identity discrimination issues.138 There, the Michigan district court
determined that the defendant funeral home had engaged in gender-based
stereotyping by terminating the funeral director for failing to behave and
dress like a stereotypical male.139 The director was transitioning from male
to female, and she desired to wear feminine clothing to work, but the fu-
neral home had a gender-specific clothing policy which required men to
wear pant suits and women to wear skirts.140 When the funeral director
began to conform to the feminine clothing requirements, she was termi-
nated.141 Despite the court’s finding of gender-based stereotyping in viola-
tion of Price Waterhouse, the court dismissed the EEOC’s enforcement
action for wrongful termination under Title VII because it concluded that
claim under a state human rights law). But see Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., Inc., 164
N.Y.S.2d 547, 556 (1995) (holding that a “transsexual” person was included in a
subgroup of men, and could bring a same-sex harassment claim because of the har-
assment they endured for undergoing surgery and hormone treatments).
135. Courts generally follow one of three analytical frameworks: (1) gender nonconform-
ity approach, (2) per se, and (3) constructionalist approach. See Jason Lee, Lost in
Translation: The Challenges of Remedying Transgender Employment Discrimination
Under Title VII, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 423, 423 (2012) (evaluating the three
general judicial constructs surrounding gender identity claims).
136. Id. at 423 (discussing how a narrow focus unnecessarily excludes many members of
the LGBTQIA community when interpretations are based on comparison of binary
sexes).
137. Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. 2:00-cv-03114, 2002 WL 31098541, at *30
(E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002).
138. EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D.
Mich. 2016).
139. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d at 840.
140. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d at 840.
141. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d at 840.
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the funeral home established an exemption for compliance with Title VII
under RFRA.142 As discussed in Section IV.B below, RFRA legislation pro-
hibits the “[g]overnment [from] substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise
of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability”
unless the government “demonstrates that application of the burden to the
person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2)
is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.”143 RFRA was amended to ensure coverage for “any exercise of relig-
ion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious be-
lief.”144 Thus, RFRA provides more protections to entities from government
regulation than the Establishment Clause, thereby accommodating
religion.145
In R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes the funeral home argued that
Title VII and the EEOC’s enforcement action substantially burdened its
religious beliefs.146 The EEOC filed an appeal from the district court’s rul-
ing, and the terminated funeral director then joined the suit.147 In response
to the appeal, the funeral home contended that courts were attempting to
expand sex discrimination to include a broader gender discrimination classi-
fication under Title VII.148 Specifically, the funeral home argued:
[t]he term “sex” as used in § 2000e-2(a) is not synonymous with
the term “gender” . . . The term “sex” in Title VII refers to an
individual’s distinguishing biological or anatomical characteris-
tics, whereas the term “gender” refers to an individual’s sexual
identity. . . . Simply stated, Congress did not intend Title VII to
protect transsexuals from discrimination on the basis of their
transsexualism.149
142. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d at 841.
143. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000b-1(a)-(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 103-141).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2012) (RLUIPA addresses governmental land use regu-
lations and substantial burdens on persons residing in or confined to an institution).
145. See Employment Div.v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb (1993); see also Frederick
Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassel, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception
Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 343, 348 (2014).
146. Response Brief of Appellee R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 2017 WL
2222848, at *37-38 (6th Cir. May 17, 2017).
147. EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., No. 16-2424 (6th Cir. 2016).
148. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., No. 16-2424.
149. Reply Brief for EEOC as Appellant at 3, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc.,
201 F. Supp. 3d (6th Cir. 2016) (No. 16-2424).
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Conversely, the EEOC argued that the trial court interpreted “sex-stere-
otyping” too narrowly and failed to recognize that transgender individuals
fail to conform to expected sex characteristics not only in the way they
dress, but in their use of pronouns, name, and appearance.150 The EEOC
contended that defining sex by using “chromosome based” evidence “ex-
cludes not only transgender people, but many more intersex Americans,
from the protections of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”151
Of particular interest to this Article, the EEOC’s reply brief in R.G. &
G.R. Harris Funeral Homes indicated that the narrow interpretation of sex
“neglected the existence of many intersex people, who in the past were com-
monly referred to as hermaphrodites and ‘whose sex cannot be neatly cate-
gorized into male or female.’”152 Citing statistics from the Intersex Society
of North America, the EEOC noted “millions of Americans are not biologi-
cally male or female because they have neither XX nor XY chromosomes or
have some other intersex condition.”153
Prior to the Trump administration, presidential executive policy fa-
vored the broader interpretation of “sex” to include protections from sexual
orientation and gender identity discrimination under both Title VII and
Title IX, two important sex-based discrimination statutes.154 Under
the Obama administration, the DOJ noted that Title VII “includes
150. See EEOC Says Basing Sex On ‘Chromosomes’ Excludes Millions from Bias Protections
EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 31 WESTLAW J. EMP. 3 (2017).
There is significant concern that the EEOC will not pursue an appeal, and that the
EEOC’s administrative position on the definition of “sex” was a split 3-2 vote. See
Donna L. Roberts & Stephen H. Price, Testing Your LGBTQ I.Q. in the Workplace,
35 ACC DOCKET 42 (2017). The EEOC is now under a Republican majority. Id.
151. EEOC Says Basing Sex on ‘Chromosomes’ Excludes Millions from Bias Protections
EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, supra note 150, at 1.
152. Id.
153. Id. However, in support of a narrower interpretation, Douglas Wardlow at the Alli-
ance Defending Freedom said in an email dated June 12, 2017 that transgender and
intersex people are not comparable because intersex conditions are “objectively verifi-
able” by looking at an individual’s DNA, and are in fact protected by Title VII. Id.
at 2. By contrast, a person’s “sexuality” cannot always be easily defined by DNA. See
Ilana Gelfman, Because of Intersex: Intersexuality, Title VII, and the Reality of Discrim-
ination “Because of . . .[Perceived] Sex, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 55, 62
(2010) (Medical and scientific evidence reflects that there are physical, hormonal,
and chromosomal anomalies that render a person’s maleness or femaleness com-
pletely ambiguous.).
154. See Rebecca Hersher & Carrie Johnson, Trump Administration Rescinds Obama Rule
on Transgender Students’ Bathroom Use, NPR, Feb. 22, 2017, https://www.npr.org/
sections/thetwo-way/2017/02/22/516664633/trump-administration-rescinds-obam
a-rule-on-transgender-students-bathroom-use. Title IX cases often apply the princi-
ples developed under Title VII. E.g. Videckis v. Pepperdine Univ., 150 F.Supp. 3d
1151, 1158 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
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discrimination because an employee’s gender identification is as a member
of a particular sex, or because the employee is transitioning, or has transi-
tioned, to another sex.”155 Under President Obama, the DOJ decided to
“no longer assert that Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination based
on sex [did] not encompass gender identity per se (including transgender
discrimination).”156
Under President Trump, the DOJ’s position has begun to change. For
example, in the Zarda v. Altitude Express case, the DOJ withdrew its prior
interpretation and indicated that Title VII does not protect against sexual
orientation discrimination.157 The DOJ also currently argues that the
EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII is not entitled to deference or control-
ling weight.158 Because the LGBTQIA community is subject to conflicting
outcomes depending on political whims, it is clear that congressional inter-
vention is needed.159 The constant policy shifts threaten to destabilize an
entire community.
ii. Sexual Orientation Discrimination as a
Form of Sex Discrimination
Beyond questions of gender identity, it is also unclear whether dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation is protected under Title
VII.160 Until the Seventh Circuit decided Hively v. Ivy Tech Community Col-
155. MEMORANDUM FROM U.S. ATTORNEY GEN. TO U.S. ATTORNEYS, 2 (Dec. 15,
2014), http://www.justice.gov/file/188671/download.
156. Id.
157. Daniel Wiessner, U.S. Justice Department Says Anti-bias Law Does Not Protect Gay
Workers, REUTERS, July 27, 2017 9:53 AM, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
court-LGBTQIA-idUSKBN1AC2DZ.
158. Id.
159. In light of potential conflicting outcomes depending on judicial interpretations of
the breadth of the word “sex” and its protections, congressional intervention is
needed. See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004); cf. Glenn v.
Brumby, 663 F.3d at 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting “governmental acts based
upon gender stereotypes—which presume that men and women’s appearance and
behavior will be determined by their sex—must be subjected to heightened scrutiny
[under the Fourteenth Amendment] because they embody ’the very stereotype the
law condemns’” (quoting J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 138 (1994)).
160. See Hively v. Ivy Tech Comm. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 347 (7th Cir. 2017); cf.
Evans v. Georgia Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1256 (11th Cir. 2017). For example,
in Lewis v. High Point Reg’l Health Sys., 79 F. Supp. 3d 588, 589–90 (E.D.N.C.
2015), the court noted that sexual orientation and gender identity are two distinct
concepts. This more nuanced understanding of gender identity seems likely to result
in more courts in the future allowing claims for Title VII discrimination based on
the transgender nature of the plaintiff. See also Rumble v. Fairview Health Serv.,
2015 WL 1197415, at *7, *10 (D.Minn. 2015) (unreported opinion finding the
ACA extends protections on basis of gender identity).
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lege in 2017, no federal circuit had found that sexual orientation, separate
and distinct from sex-stereotyping, was protected under Title VII.161 Hively
was a positive step, but it is unclear whether it marks a new trend in broad-
ening the definition of “sex,” so it does not diminish the need for statutory
clarity on the issues of sexual orientation and gender identity
discrimination.
Although this Article focuses on transgender and DSD discrimination,
sexual orientation cases and their rationale prove instructive regarding the
need for clarity around “sex” and sexual orientation. In Hively, the Seventh
Circuit held that Title VII protects against sexual orientation discrimination
even absent a claim of sex-stereotyping.162 In so doing, the court declined to
follow the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital,
which held that a lesbian security guard could not bring a claim of sexual
orientation and gender nonconformity discrimination against her former
employer.163 The security guard, Evans, alleged that she had been denied
equal pay for her work and had been harassed and battered for not
“carry[ing] herself in a ‘traditionally woman[ly] manner.’”164 Although Ev-
ans did not publicize her sexuality, she wore male clothing and had a more
masculine haircut.165 The Evans court concluded that sexual orientation dis-
crimination was not actionable under Title VII, but gender nonconformity
was a valid sex-based discrimination claim.166 The court remanded the case
to allow the plaintiff to allege sufficient facts that her gender nonconformity
was the reason for the discriminatory treatment.167 The court dismissed her
claims of discrimination on the basis of her sexual orientation as unpro-
tected by Title VII.168
The Seventh Circuit reached a different conclusion on a similar the-
ory. In Hively, the plaintiff was an openly lesbian female adjunct professor
161. Hively, 853 F.3d at 363–65.
162. Hively, 853 F.3d at 369–70.
163. Hively, 853 F.3d at 342 (citing Evans, 850 F.3d).
164. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1251.
165. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1251.
166. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1254–55. A majority of cases have held no Title VII protection
for sexual orientation. See, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762
(6th Cir. 2006); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 260–61 (3d
Cir. 2001); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701,
707 (7th Cir. 2000); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 2000); Higgins
v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Wrightson v.
Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996), abrogated by Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards
& Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989).
167. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1255.
168. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1255.
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who applied for six full-time positions and was denied each time.169 Her
part-time contract as an adjunct professor was ultimately not renewed.170
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined, by examining Supreme
Court case law, that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is
discrimination based on sex, as it relates to the question of with whom the
person intimately associates.171 The court held that precedent such as Price
Waterhouse172 (gender-based stereotyping is actionable), and Oncale173
(same-sex harassment is actionable)—when interpreted in light of
Obergefell174 (same sex individuals have a fundamental right to marry)—
required it to reexamine how sexual orientation claims are analyzed.175 The
Seventh Circuit recognized that it was bound by statutory interpretations,
including the extent to which Congress had considered and rejected amend-
ments to Title VII, to include sexual orientation as a protected class.176 But
the Seventh Circuit also noted that it must examine statutory language as it
evolves over time in a manner consistent with Supreme Court analysis.177
It remains unclear how claims of discrimination on the basis of gender
identity and sexual orientation will fare under Title VII.178 Several courts
have found that gender identity claims are a form of sex discrimination
under a sex stereotyping claim, rather than a sexual preference argument.179
169. Hively, 853 F.3d at 341.
170. Hively, 853 F.3d at 341.
171. See Hively, 853 F.3d at 350 (recognizing that a majority of courts have determined
that sexual orientation in and of itself is not protected).
172. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244 (1989).
173. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 118 (1998).
174. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).
175. Hively, 853 F.3d at 342–43.
176. Hively, 853 F.3d at 343–44.
177. Hively, 853 F.3d at 350–51.
178. Compare Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, 850 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2017)
(holding Title VII does not protect persons based on their sexual orientation), with
Boutillier v. Hartford Pub. Sch. 221 F. Supp. 3d 255, 267 (D.Conn. 2016)
(“Straightforward statutory interpretation and logic dictate that sexual orientation
cannot be extricated from sex.”). See also Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214
F.3d 213, 215 (1st Cir. 2000) (discussing gender identity protection under Title
VII). But cf.  Underwood v. Archer Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 857 F. Supp. 96, 98 (D.D.C.
1994) (indicating that transsexuality is not included within the definition of “sex”
under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act); Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights
Comm’n, 337 N.W.2d 470, 474 (Iowa 1983) (discussing that transsexuals are not
covered by sex discrimination laws).
179. See, e.g., Evans, 850 F.3d at 1255 (holding Title VII does not protect persons based
on their sexual orientation); Boutillier, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 267 (“Straightforward
statutory interpretation and logic dictate that sexual orientation cannot be extricated
from sex.”); Rosa, 214 F.3d at 215 (discussing gender identity protection under Title
VII).
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Other state courts have determined that there is no protection for gender
identity as a sex-stereotyping claim.180
This judicial inconsistency necessitates reform. When employers as-
sume an employee should act, dress, or be intimate in a certain manner
(that correlates to their sex designation), they are necessarily perceiving a
person’s sexual characteristics. When an employer takes a negative or dis-
criminatory action against the person because of their sexual characteristics,
the employer is discriminating on the basis of sex. To combat this, several
states have enacted broad antidiscrimination laws. But as is established be-
low, these efforts don’t go far enough.
III. STATE ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS AND PREEMPTION
A. Preemption Issues
Many states seek to combat disparity and sex discrimination.181
Twenty-three states have either enacted or introduced equal pay acts, includ-
ing some whose scope is broad enough to extend protection to individuals
on the basis of gender identity and sexual orientation.182
California and New York are two examples of the former sort of
state—those attempting to correct pay disparity based on gender identity
and sexual orientation.183 Such state “fair pay” laws go farther than the fed-
eral Equal Pay Act. Fair pay laws require employers to pay employees the
same for work of comparable skill, effort, and responsibility,184 while the
federal Equal Pay Act only requires the same pay for equal skill, effort, and
responsibility.185 However, there is some reason to think that employers
who raise wages based on their state’s law could face Title VII claims by the
comparators themselves.186 If an employer, abiding by state law, raised the
pay of an employee in a “comparable” but not “equal” job, but did not give
commensurate raises to all employees, they could face a reverse discrimina-
tion claim by the nonminority employees.187
180. See Underwood, 857 F. Supp. at 98 (indicating that transsexuality is not included
within the definition of “sex” under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act);
see also Sommers, 337 N.W.2d at 474 (discussing that transsexuals are not covered by
sex discrimination laws).
181. See Velte, supra note 20, at 22.
182. See id.
183. Allan G. King, Does Title VII Preempt State Fair Pay Laws?, 32 A.B.A. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 65, 70–71 (2016).
184. Id. at 65.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 66, 70.
187. See id. at 91.
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The key question for those employers is whether Title VII and the
EPA preempt state wage laws. Federal law preempts state law in one of three
scenarios: (1) when Congress explicitly says that the federal statute preempts
state law, (2) when preemption is inferred because Congress enacts a com-
prehensive regulatory scheme that leaves no room for state action regarding
the same subject matter, and (3) when a state statute imposes requirements
inconsistent with federal law or stands as an obstacle to accomplishing Con-
gress’s purposes.188 Title VII states:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve
any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment pro-
vided by any present or future law of any State or political subdi-
vision of a State, other than any such law which purports to
require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlaw-
ful employment practice under this subchapter.189
This clause prevents employers from using state law as a defense when their
action violates Title VII.190 For example, although Title VII prohibits dis-
crimination based on religion, Congress was cognizant that religious organi-
zations need to be able to manage their internal religious affairs and their
employment relationships with their ministers.191 Thus, Congress carved
out an exception to compliance with Title VII based in part on religious
reasons, as we discuss more fully below.
Because of the breadth of these laws, the LGBTQIA community
might have viable claims under state law protections that they would not
have under federal law.192 But those state laws that require employers to pay
all employees the same for comparable (rather than equal) work may also
open employers to reverse discrimination claims under Title VII.193
Courts have reached differing conclusions regarding whether a plain-
tiff must actually be a member of a protected class, rather than simply per-
ceived to be a member of a protected class, in order to be protected under
188. Id. at 69.
189. Id. at 70.
190. Id.
191. See generally Roger W. Dyer, Jr., Qualifying for the Title VII Religious Organization
Exemption: Federal Circuits Split Over Proper Test, 76 MO. L. REV. 545, 546 (2011)
(discussing Title VII and the religious exemptions in the employment context); see
also 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-1(a) (Westlaw through P.L. 115-90).
192. See King, supra note 183, at 65.
193. See King, supra note 183, at 79–80 (discussing Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658
(2009), which held that promotional qualification test that seemingly had a disparate
impact on minorities could not be discarded without creating reverse discrimination
claims for those who passed the exam).
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the federal laws.194 In instances where a plaintiff must show actual member-
ship, expansive state laws would provide certain plaintiffs with more rights
than those afforded under federal law.195 This situation triggers the preemp-
tion issue.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Ricci has only further muddied the
waters on questions of reverse discrimination under federal law. In Ricci, an
employer recognized that its minority employees overwhelmingly failed a
promotional exam, reflecting what the employer believed to be a disparate
impact.196 The employer determined that it must discard the exam in light
of the near probability that it would lose a disparate impact claim.197 How-
ever, in discarding the exam, the employer effectively denied white employ-
ees the promotion.198 The white employees sued for reverse discrimination
and won.199 After Ricci, for an employer to successfully defend a reverse
discrimination claim, she must have clear evidence that she would lose a
race-based action if she retained the policy that had had the unintentional
disparate impact on minorities.200 Accordingly, an employer cannot default
to more favorable treatment of minorities out of fear of future litigation if
she has an affirmative defense to a disparate impact claim, such as a bona
fide occupational requirement.201
After Ricci, valiant attempts by state legislators to rectify workplace
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and status may be over-
turned on preemption grounds.202 Currently, employers who raise wages for
one employee, without clear proof that failure to do so would violate Title
VII, face potential reverse discrimination claims under Title VII.203 To re-
solve this disparity, gender identity and sexual orientation must be consid-
ered a constitutionally protected class. By interpreting the word “sex” more
broadly in all its contexts, we would eliminate any preemption or reverse
discrimination problems.
194. Jessica A. Clarke, Protected Class Gatekeeping, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 115–16
(2017) (citing cases and conflicting analysis regarding whether a person who is per-
ceived to be a member of a protected class is actually a member of a protected class
under Title VII).
195. See King, supra note 183, at 65.
196. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2661.
197. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2661.
198. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2661.
199. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2663.
200. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2661.
201. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2661.
202. See King, supra note 183, at 65–67, 91–92 (2016).
203. Id. at 91–92.
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B. Constitutional Protections Concerning Sex and LGBTQIA Status
as a Protected Class
To determine the Supreme Court’s potential analysis of the word “sex”
in the employment context, we examine whether an individual’s status as
LGBTQIA would be considered a protected classification under constitu-
tional law. “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
commands that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all persons
similarly situated should be treated alike.”204 Laws that provide classifica-
tions are generally examined according to whether they are “rationally re-
lated to a legitimate state interest,” but this “general rule gives way . . . when
a statute classifies” groups that have historically been subject to discrimina-
tion or “impinge[s] on personal rights protected by the Constitution.”205
204. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)).
205. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439. If presented with this question, the Supreme
Court would examine whether transgender persons (or the LGBTQIA community)
are a suspect class by analyzing the following factors: (1) whether the discrimination
is based on “stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative” of the group’s abilities,
and (2) whether the group has experienced a history of discrimination. See Massa-
chusetts Bd. Of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam); City of
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441 (discussing how gender distinctions are likely based on
stereotypes, rather than the actual “relative capabilities of men and women”). The
Supreme Court also has considered whether the group has “obvious, immutable, or
distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group” and whether the
group cannot adequately protect itself within the political process in determining if
they should be classified as a suspect class. See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602
(1987) (close relatives are not a suspect class and have no right to heightened scru-
tiny); Lying v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (finding parents, children, and
siblings are not a suspect class); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198–99 (1976) (dis-
cussing stereotype discrimination); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686
(1973) (finding that sex is an immutable characteristic); Hibbs v. Dep’t of Human
Res., 273 F.3d 844, 856 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (noting that
differences in gender are rarely “relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state
interest”) (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000)); Bd. of
Educ. of Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. Dep’t of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850,  873
(2016) (S.D. Ohio 2016) (transgender persons have immutable characteristics war-
ranting heightened scrutiny). Although these additional factors would assist in the
court’s assessment, they are not required, as evidenced by cases involving alienage
and immutability. Even though one can alter residency, making alienage not immu-
table, a person’s alienage is still entitled to strict scrutiny analysis. See Nyquist v.
Maculet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n.1 (1977). Aside from the Equal Protection and Due Pro-
cess challenges, transgender and DSD persons may have a strong argument that their
gender identity is an immutable characteristic and entitled to constitutional privacy
protections. Holtzman, supra note 21, at 1961 (arguing individual autonomy is a
liberty interest protected by the Fourth Amendment).
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Laws that discriminate based on a “suspect” classification (race) or a “quasi-
suspect” classification (gender) are subject to heightened judicial scrutiny.206
The Supreme Court has held that “sex-based classifications [are]
quasi-suspect,” so they warrant intermediate scrutiny, which requires any
regulation to be substantially related to an important governmental inter-
est.207 However, with respect to transgender persons, it is unclear what level
of scrutiny the Supreme Court would apply.208 In General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert, the Supreme Court grappled with whether a General Electric policy
excluding pregnancy-related disability benefits violated Title VII.209 There
the Court held:
While there is no necessary inference that Congress, in choosing
this language, intended to incorporate into Title VII concepts of
discrimination which have evolved from court decisions constru-
ing the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the similarities between the congressional language and some of
those decisions surely indicate that the latter are a useful starting
point in interpreting the former. Particularly in the case of defin-
ing the term ‘discrimination,’ which Congress has nowhere in
Title VII defined, those cases afford an existing body of law ana-
lyzing and discussing that term in a legal context not wholly
dissimilar to the concerns which Congress manifested in enact-
ing Title VII.210
The Supreme Court’s decision in General Electric led Congress to en-
act the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in an effort to ensure that pregnancy-
related discrimination was prohibited under federal law.211 In light of this
instruction, an examination of recent Supreme Court analysis with respect
to the LGBTQIA community demonstrates that protections against dis-
crimination based on “sex” should reach transgender and DSD persons. For
206. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439; Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 374 (4th
Cir. 2015) (recognizing that the Supreme Court “identified sex-based classifications
as quasi-suspect,” and “has meaningfully altered the way it views both sex and sexual
orientation through the Equal Protection lens”).
207. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2661.
208. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Adkins v.
City of New York, 143 F. Supp. 3d 134, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (suggesting the Su-
preme Court should apply heightened judicial scrutiny in light of history of discrim-
ination against the transgender community).
209. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
210. General Elec., 429 U.S. at 133.
211. See Deborah Dinner, Beyond “Best Practices”: Employment-Discrimination Law in the
Neoliberal Era, 92 IND. L. J. 1059, 1092–93 (2017).
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example, in 2015, the Supreme Court held in Obergefell v. Hodges that state
prohibitions on same-sex marriage violate the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses.212 The Court noted that under the Due Process Clause
individuals have certain fundamental liberties “including intimate choices
that define personal identity and beliefs.”213 Further, because marriage has
historically been a constitutionally protected right that could not be
abridged, it is fundamental in nature.214 Notably, the Court said:
The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long
have seemed natural and just, but its inconsistency with the cen-
tral meaning of the fundamental right to marry is now manifest.
With that knowledge must come the recognition that laws ex-
cluding same-sex couples from the marriage right impose stigma
and injury of the kind prohibited by our basic charter.215
The Court further noted: “in interpreting the Equal Protection
Clause, the Court has recognized that new insights and societal understand-
ings can reveal unjustified inequality within our most fundamental institu-
tions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged.”216 However, because
the Court found in favor of the plaintiffs on the issue of a fundamental
right to marry, rather than finding the LGBTQIA community is a suspect
class, it remains unclear what level of scrutiny the Court would apply in a
discrimination challenge based solely on Equal Protection, rather than the
exercise of a fundamental right.217
Arguably, the Supreme Court precedent provides a basis for courts to
examine new insight and societal understandings that reflect a broader inter-
pretation of “sex.” But that presents new questions. May a court hold un-
constitutional only those laws that implicate a person’s fundamental rights,
such as marriage, or are status-based infringements unconstitutional even
when they don’t violate a fundamental right?218 The Supreme Court’s
Obergefell rationale seems to provide adequate support in favor of finding
that the LGBTQIA community is a suspect class and entitled to protection
from discriminatory treatment.
212. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2584 (2015).
213. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597.
214. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598.
215. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
216. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603.
217. See Charles Cohen, Losing Your Children: The Failure To Extend Civil Rights Protec-
tions To Transgender Parents, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 536, 554 (2017).
218. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (striking down Internal Revenue
Service rule that prohibited same-sex spouse from claiming federal estate tax
exemption).
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Gender, in the binary sense, has received quasi-suspect classification
and the Supreme Court seems to recognize that distinctions based on fun-
damental characteristics are unwarranted.219 Nearly 15 years ago, the Su-
preme Court struck down a Texas state statute that criminalized sodomy
between consenting adults.220 The Court found that individuals have a lib-
erty interest in “respect for their private lives” and the state statute furthered
no legitimate interest by interfering with the private sexual lives of con-
senting adults.221 Likewise, in 1996, the Supreme Court found a Colorado
constitutional amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause because it
precluded legislation that would protect the status of individuals based on
their “homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or re-
lationships.”222 The Court determined that the amendment was an im-
proper status-based classification that “classifies homosexuals not to further
a proper legislative end, but to make them unequal to everyone else.”223
These cases support the conclusion that the determination of one’s
sex, like one’s sexual orientation, is within one’s own purview and private
life, and it is thus a fundamental right. How a person lives, dresses, and acts
are all inherent physical or psychological traits and as such are part and
parcel of a person’s fundamental characteristics. Gender identity and sexual
orientation are fundamental in nature, so they deserve quasi-suspect classifi-
cation under Due Process and legal protection in a variety of contexts, in-
cluding employment.224
According to Supreme Court rationale, sex and gender arguably are
“quasi suspect” classes entitled to intermediate scrutiny that requires any
restrictive government regulation based on sex to be substantially related to
an important governmental interest.225 Federal district courts have recently
219. See Autumn L. Bernhardt, The Profound and Intimate Power of the Obergefell Deci-
sion: Equal Dignity, 25 TUL. J. L. & SEXUALITY 1, 16–17 (2016).
220. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
221. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
222. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996).
223. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 (holding the legislation was based on “animosity toward the
class” and had no rational relation to a legitimate governmental purpose).
224. See Levasseur, supra note 12 at 980–82, nn.214, 238 (detailing medical evidence that
suggests brain function and hormonal influences rather than genitalia play a role in a
person’s gender identity).
225. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982). See also Adkins
v. City of New York, 143 F. Supp. 3d 134, 139 (S.D. N.Y. 2015). Some cases note
that the commingling of the terms “gender” and “sex” is inappropriate and that laws
protect the former and not the latter. For example, in Lewis v. High Point Regional
Health System, 79 F. Supp. 3d 588, 589 (E.D. N.C. 2015), the court noted that
sexual orientation and gender identity are two distinct concepts. This more nuanced
understanding of gender identity seems likely to result in more courts in the future
allowing claims for Title VII discrimination based on the transsexual or transgender
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recognized that heightened judicial scrutiny is appropriate in Equal Protec-
tion claims for transgender persons.226 Recently, Judge Jed S. Rakoff in the
Southern District of New York evaluated whether laws that discriminate
against transgender persons are entitled to a heightened level of scrutiny.227
In Adkins v. City of New York, Judge Rakoff determined that a transgender
arrestee could proceed with an Equal Protection claim based on his discrim-
inatory treatment, relative to other arrestees who were not transgender and
were arrested for the same reasons.228 In evaluating whether transgender in-
dividuals were a suspect class, Judge Rakoff reviewed the four elements es-
poused by the Supreme Court and concluded that transgender persons were
subject to a history of discrimination and persecution; their status bore no
relation to their abilities to contribute to society; their status as transgender
was a “sufficiently discernable characteristic to define a discrete minority
class”; and they were a politically powerless minority.229 Accordingly, he
allowed the plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim against the city to proceed.230
In 2017, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to address some as-
pects of the constitutional protections for the transgender community in
Gloucester County School Board v. G.G.231 The Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals found in favor of a transgender student’s right to use the bathroom of
their choosing (rather than the bathroom that matches their genitalia) by
relying on the Department of Justice’s and Department of Education’s in-
terpretation of Title IX (under the Obama administration).232 The Obama
administration’s interpretation of Title IX—and by extension, Title VII as
well—allowed students to use the bathroom of their choosing.233 On ap-
peal, the United States Supreme Court accepted certiorari, but prior to its
decision on February 22, 2017, the Trump administration rescinded the
two departments’ prior interpretations of “sex.”234 The Supreme Court re-
manded the matter to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to examine the
nature of the plaintiff. See also Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs. 2015 WL 1197415,
at *10 (D. Minn. 2015) (unreported opinion finding the ACA extends protections
on basis of gender identity).
226. See Evancho, et al. v. Pine-Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 288 (W.D. Pa.
2017); Bd. of Educ. of Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. Dep’t of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d
850, 873 (S.D. Ohio 2016); Adkins, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 140.
227. Adkins, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 138–39.
228. Adkins, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 138, 142.
229. Adkins, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 139–40.
230. Adkins, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 142.
231. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017).
232. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Glouster Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016), va-
cated and remanded by 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017).
233. G.G., 822 F.3d at 720–21. Title IX prohibits discrimination “on the basis of sex” by
schools that accept federal funding.
234. Peters et al., supra note 78.
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issue without regard to the two departments’ prior interpretations.235 The
Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine whether
the issue was moot, as the student had since graduated.236 As a result, there
is no clarity for the LGBTQIA community on the issue.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTS TO DISCRIMINATE
Despite the Supreme Court’s seemingly broad interpretation of sex
and the potentially strong argument that transgender and DSD persons are
a quasi-suspect class that warrants heightened judicial scrutiny, Supreme
Court precedent can also be an obstacle for the LGBTQIA community. In
particular, the conflict between constitutional protections of a suspect class
on the one hand, and an employer’s First Amendment and statutory relig-
ious freedom rights on the other, warrant congressional clarification. Con-
gress could clarify the application of the word “sex” by amending the
Dictionary Act237 to include a broader definition of “sex.” Such an amend-
ment would apply to all federal statutes unless the statute itself specifically
modified the term.238
As we discussed above, when faced with sex discrimination claims
under either the EPA or Title VII, an employer has a number of affirmative
defenses, including inter alia seniority systems, merit-based protections, and
justification because of factors “other than sex.” Beyond these, employers
also have constitutional and statutorily-provided rights that act as defenses
to discrimination claims. Building upon the inherent conflicts between the
interpretation of “sex” and an employer’s constitutional rights, we begin by
discussing the employer’s First Amendment right to be free from substantial
burdens on their religious beliefs, the right to free speech, and to freely
associate. Next, we address an employer’s statutory protections under state
and federal RFRA laws, and whether these laws provide employers with
affirmative defenses in private actions.
235. See Shannon Price Minter, Déjà Vu All Over Again: Recourse to Biology by Opponents
Transgender Equality, 95 N.C. L. Rev. 1161, 1169 (2017) (discussing Gloucester
Cty. School Bd. v. G.G. ex. rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239).
236. See generally, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (explaining that Congress provides definitions for terms to
be used in interpreting any Act of Congress unless otherwise indicated by the
legislation).
237. See generally 1 U.S.C. § 1. See also Rowland v. California Men’s Colony 506 U.S.
194, 200 (1993) (discussing the use of the Dictionary Act).
238. 1 U.S.C. § 1.
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A. An Employer’s First Amendment Right to Discriminate
Employers may raise three constitutional defenses to discrimination
challenges by the LGBTQIA community: the employer’s right to the free
exercise of religion, the right to free speech, and the right to freely associate
by choosing its own employees.239
1. Right to Free Exercise of Religion
With limited exceptions, state and federal governments are prohibited
from imposing laws that infringe upon a person’s or entity’s First Amend-
ment rights.240 An employer’s argument under the First Amendment is that
the statutory protection in question—be it the EPA, Title VII, or a state
antidiscrimination law—violates his sincerely held religious tenets, and is
thus unconstitutional.241
There is considerable confusion over the extent to which an employer
can cite a sincerely held religious belief to justify discrimination against its
employees.242 The protections guaranteed by antidiscrimination laws such as
Title VII and the EPA are met with the force of the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment. The Free Exercise Clause states that “Congress shall
make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” of religion.243 And Title VII
itself exempts religious organizations and their discriminatory actions when
such actions are based on religion:
[T]he Courts of Appeals have uniformly recognized . . . a ‘minis-
terial exception,’” arising from “the First Amendment, that pre-
cludes application of [Title VII] to claims concerning the
employment relationship between a religious institution and its
ministers.244
In order to benefit from this immunization, generally an employer
must be a “religious institution” that is discriminating on religious grounds
against its “ministers.”245 The scope of these two terms remains at issue. In
239. See Velte, supra note 20 at 6, 41.
240. See Velte, supra note 20, at 34–36.
241. See Sarah M. Stephens, Employer’s Conscience After Hobby Lobby & the Continuing
Conflict Between Women’s Rights & Religious Freedom, 24 BUFF. J. GENDER L. &
SOC. POL’Y 1, 24 (2015–16).
242. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Court found that secular, for-profit corpo-
rations could exercise religion by “pursuing religious goals.” Id. at 24–26.
243. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
244. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171,
173 (2012).
245. See Stephens, supra note 241, at 20.
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2012, the Supreme Court unanimously found in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC that the First Amendment provided
an affirmative defense for religious schools using the ministerial exemption
to the ADA after the school terminated a teacher who threatened to file a
disability discrimination claim.246 In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court found that
the terminated teacher was considered a “minister” even though the major-
ity of her day was spent teaching secular subjects.247 The Court focused on
her title, “Minster of Religion, Commissioned,” to conclude that the
teacher had a “significant degree of religious training,” had been hired “by a
formal process of commissioning,” and that she was responsible for relaying
“the Church’s message and . . . its mission.”248 The Supreme Court made it
clear that the “interest of religious groups in choosing who will preach their
beliefs, teach their faiths, and carry out their mission,” is protected by the
Free Exercise Clause and protects churches and other religious
organizations.249
Prior to Hosanna-Tabor, Supreme Court precedent prevented the use
of the Free Exercise Clause to definitively defend against laws that were
considered neutral and generally applicable.250 Still, some employers had
successfully argued that the exemption permitted religious-based organiza-
tions to discriminate against women.251 “[E]ven before Hosanna-Tabor, the
courts of appeals had applied the ministerial exception to hospitals, universi-
ties, and nursing homes with religious missions.”252 Thus, the term “relig-
ious institutions” is not limited solely to churches, and it potentially
encompasses a variety of for-profit businesses.253
246. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 190
(2012).
247. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190–92.
248. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 191.
249. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196.
250. See Stephens, supra note 241 at 20–21. See also Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 193.
251. Stephens supra note 241. EEOC v. Cath. U. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 455, 470 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (denying nun’s Title VII claim based on sex discrimination under relig-
ious exemption as she was a professor for a Catholic university); McClure v. Salva-
tion Army, 460 F.3d 553, 560–61 (1972) (denying woman’s Title VII wrongful
termination claim after she complained about unequal pay for women as Salvation
Army is religiously affiliated and exempt from its application); see also Rayburn v.
Gen. Conf. of the Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168 (7th Cir. 1985)
(finding for church under religious exemption despite evidence of sex and racial
discrimination); but see Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colorado, 289
F.3d 648, 657, 659 (10th Cir. 2002) (limiting ministerial exemption to those posi-
tions that truly are “rooted in religious belief”).
252. Elliott Williams, Resurrecting Free Exercise Hosanna-Tabor Lutheran Church &
School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012), 36 HARV. J. L. PUB. POL’Y 391, 400
(2013).
253. Id. at 395, 400.
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More recently, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of a for-profit en-
tity’s religious rights in Hobby Lobby v. Burwell.254 The watershed decision
focused on whether a for-profit corporation was a “person” under RFRA
and whether the company could refuse to pay for employee health insurance
plans based on its religious beliefs.255 Female employees, through govern-
ment intervention, challenged the company-employer’s refusal to pay for
health coverage as required by the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) on gender
discrimination grounds.256
One of the more controversial aspects of the Hobby Lobby decision was
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the word “person,” as RFRA did not
define it.257 Because RFRA did not indicate otherwise, the Court concluded
the word “person” included entities.258 Although the Court’s holding seems
to be limited to closely-held corporations, its discussion of the word “per-
sons” is expansive enough to include both nonprofit and for-profit corpora-
tions.259 The Court then examined whether the entities could “exercise
religion.”260 Because corporations may operate for “any lawful purpose”
under state corporate law, the Supreme Court held corporations can sup-
port charitable and religious endeavors.261
Because of the breadth of the Hobby Lobby and Hosanna-Tabor, the
LGBTQIA community is rightfully concerned that a closely-held corpora-
tion could argue that its sincerely held religious beliefs allow it to discrimi-
nate against the LGBTQIA community.262 Reading these two Supreme
Court precedents together could allow an employer with a decidedly relig-
ious owner and articulated religious mission statement to refuse to hire
254. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
255. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751.
256. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 (although the employer provided coverage for some
types of birth control, it refused to provide coverage for a certain drug which it
deemed tantamount to an abortion, which violated the company’s religious
objections).
257. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
258. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
259. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2769.
260. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2769.
261. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771.
262. Compare Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th
Cir. 2012) (declining to address Hosanna-Tabor on procedural grounds and holding
school’s argument that it terminated a female teacher who became pregnant outside
of marriage on religious grounds rather than gender-based grounds was likely pretext
for gender discrimination), with Boyd v. Harding Acad., 88 F.3d 410 (6th Cir.
1996) (holding termination based on religious beliefs against extra-marital sex was
not gender-based discrimination under Title VII), and Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline
Acad. of Wilmington, Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 139–140 (3d Cir. 2006) (declining to
review gender discrimination claim because school argued religious justifications and
court determined doing so would violate school’s First Amendment rights).
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LGBTQIA employees for managerial positions, as these positions could be
viewed as furthering the employer’s religious mission.
Our hypothetical provides an example for how this might play out.
Recall that our hypothetical photography studio is owned by a religious
couple in a small Texas town where they market their services to local
church groups by advertising in the paper and on local radio stations. Many
of their clients are churches and members of church congregations, all of
whom believe that marriage is between one man and one woman, that
same-sex intimacy is a sin, and that a person is the sex to which they were
assigned at birth. Moreover, they consider any attempt to alter a person’s
birth designation to be a sin. Although the studio is open to the public, it is
selective in its hiring practices, generally only hiring those individuals who
the owners personally know. In our hypothetical, the studio hired Sam
based on Sam’s talented portfolio. The studio never thought to inquire
about Sam’s sex and believed Sam to be male. After Sam had worked at the
studio for a year, entitling Sam to a pay raise, and other benefits, Sam dis-
closed that their birth certificate from New York reflects that Sam is “inter-
sex.” Sam applies for the vacant managerial position at the studio and seeks
a raise commensurate with the other people in managerial positions at the
studio.
If the studio were to terminate Sam upon disclosure of Sam’s intersex
birth certificate, they could argue that their actions are consistent with the
First Amendment and the ministerial exemption to Title VII (as well as the
protections afforded by RFRA, discussed below). Sam might contend that
Title VII was designed to be applicable only to truly religious organizations
and that the ministerial exemption of Hosanna-Tabor only applies to indi-
viduals who carry out the mission of the religious entity. However, in light
of judicial conflicts as to the breadth of Supreme Court precedent, Sam’s
position is weak. Reading Hobby Lobby and Hosanna-Tabor together demon-
strates that closely-held entities with religious owners engaged in a for-profit
business with an underlying faith-based mission can contend that employ-
ees—and employees in supervisory positions in particular—must conform
to the employer’s religious and moral beliefs. When they fail to do so, for
example, because they are members of the LGBTQIA community, employ-
ees can be terminated.
Some scholars argue that most courts, when presented with the minis-
terial exemption question, will construe it narrowly and will apply it only to
those entities that are truly religious in nature and those positions that
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further the entity’s religious mission.263 This has not been borne out.
Rather, the Supreme Court appears to hold that entities can have religious
convictions, and that those convictions can permeate their employment en-
vironment—even to the detriment of their employees.264 If not properly
constrained, it is not implausible to imagine a situation where business own-
ers express a religious mission in conjunction with their for-profit business
and explicitly identify what actions they believe are sinful. A religious owner
could then contend that because their employees represent their business,
and because the very existence of the LGBTQIA community is against their
religious beliefs, the employer is therefore entitled to not hire, not promote,
and even fire an LGBTQIA employee. This type of rationale imbues entities
with both the benefits of limited liability and tax protections (afforded only
to corporations that are not living persons), and with the freedom of
thought (historically afforded only to living persons). In this way, corporate
entities will benefit from legal shields that permit discrimination by simply
demonstrating that their company is owned by like-minded religious
people.265
Corporate benefits like limited liability and tax protections should
come with a concomitant obligation to waive the right to religious thought.
Those wishing to operate a business and simultaneously further their indi-
vidual religious mission should do so without state-based protections, and
without permission to discriminate.
2. Compelling Employers to Speak
Beyond free exercise defenses, corporations contend that the First
Amendment permits them to not comply with antidiscrimination laws in
instances where the law compels speech in opposition to their beliefs or
violates their right to freely associate.266 The First Amendment provides that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech. . . .”267
The Supreme Court has interpreted this clause as one that protects both the
right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking; thus, no law may
compel speech with which an actor disagrees.268 Commercial actors in the
263. Marc O. DeGirolami, Free Exercise by Moonlight, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 105,
115–16, 127–29 (2016) (detailing scholarly debate on the breadth of Hosanna-
Tabor).
264. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
265. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774 (2014).
266. Velte, supra note 20, at 35. See discussion infra Section IV A.
267. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
268. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977); see also Bob Jones U. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (denying tax exemption to university based on
university’s racially discriminatory admissions policy did not violate First Amend-
2018] B O R N  F R E E :  T O W A R D  A N  E X P A N S I V E  D E F I N I T I O N  O F  S E X 47
antidiscrimination context contend that they are entitled to an exemption
from antidiscrimination laws because complying with such laws would com-
pel a pro-LGBTQIA message, with which they have a religious
disagreement.269
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on this very issue in Craig v.
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc.270 In Masterpiece, a for-profit bakery refused to
bake a cake for a same-sex couple’s wedding because of the owners’ convic-
tions, even though it bakes cakes for opposite-sex couples.271 Plaintiffs filed
an administrative complaint alleging discrimination in violation of the Col-
orado Anti-Discrimination Act.272 The state and administrative courts ruled
in the plaintiffs’ favor and the bakery sought relief based on First Amend-
ment grounds, alleging that being forced to bake the cake was a form of
compelled speech.273 Colorado argued that the case is analogous to Rumsfeld
v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., which held that law
schools must provide equal access to military and non-military recruiters
alike despite the military’s “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” policy against gays in the
military.274 The Supreme Court determined that requiring law schools to
allow recruiters on campus regulated conduct, not speech.275
At the time of writing, it is unclear which way the Supreme Court will
decide the Masterpiece case.276 If the Supreme Court sides with the bakery,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Hobby Lobby, and Hosanna-Tabor will work together
to provide a for-profit entity with the legal defenses it needs to refuse to hire
or equally pay a member of the LGBTQIA community. But even if the
Supreme Court holds that such action constitutes discrimination, a third
ment rights); Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (requiring admission of
women to group did not violate freedom of association rights of group).
269. See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willcock, 309 P.3d 53, 64–65 (N.M. 2013).
270. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. granted, 2017
WL 2722428 (June 26, 2017).
271. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 370 P.3d at 277.
272. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 370 P.3d at 277.
273. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 370 P.3d at 283.
274. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
275. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 70.
276. See Velte, supra note 20, at 52–53; see also Alex Riley, Note, Religious Liberty vs.
Discrimination: Striking A Balance When Business Owners Refuse Service to Same-Sex
Couples Due to Religious Beliefs, 40 S. ILL. U. L.J. 301, 305–314 (2016) (discussing
case law which prohibits businesses in the wedding industry from refusing services to
same sex couples and those states that have proposed or enacted legislation to protect
businesses and their religious freedoms). But see Haley Holik, Note, You have Right to
Speak by Remaining Silent: Why  State Sanction to Create Wedding Cake is Compelled
Speech, 28 REGENT U. L. REV. 299, 301–02 (2015) (arguing that requiring busi-
nesses to bake a cake for a same sex couple is in fact compelled speech because of the
historical and ceremonial significance of wedding cakes).
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element of the First Amendment—the right to freely associate—offers em-
ployers yet another avenue of defense.
3. Compelling Association
Instructive in the First Amendment analysis of our hypothetical are
two Supreme Court cases involving antidiscrimination laws under the First
Amendment’s freedom of association analysis: Boy Scouts of America v. Dale
and Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston. Both
cases found antidiscrimination statutes to be unconstitutional as applied.277
In Boy Scouts of America, the Boy Scouts organization removed one of its
leaders, despite a state antidiscrimination law that protected against sexual
orientation discrimination, after he came out as gay.278 The Supreme Court
determined that a state statute cannot compel an organization to “accept
members where such acceptance would derogate from the organization’s ex-
pressive message.”279 The Court noted that leaders were employed to reflect
the association’s core beliefs, and thus, the association’s removal of the
leader as a director was based on protected First Amendment grounds.280
Likewise, in Hurley, a group of LGBTQIA Irish-Americans applied for
a permit to march in Boston’s annual Saint Patrick’s Day parade.281 The
private non-profit group in charge of awarding permits for the parade de-
nied the application and alleged that the state public accommodation law
violated the private non-profit group’s First Amendment right to expressive
association.282 The Court determined that parades are specifically designed
as expressive associations and the organizers should be permitted to deter-
mine whose message conforms to the group’s associational expression.283
Ultimately, the Court held that the public accommodation statute was not
unconstitutional on its face, but did violate the parade organizers’ First
Amendment rights.284
277. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 640 (2000). Hurley v. Irish-American
Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 557 (1995). See James M.
Gottry, Just Shoot Me: Public Accommodation Anti-Discrimination Laws Take Aim
First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 64 VAND. L. REV. 961, 975–981 (2011) (ad-
dressing the conflict between public accommodation laws and the freedom to expres-
sive association and highlighting that public accommodation laws should only apply
to “essential” services not all services available to the public).
278. Dale, 530 U.S. at 643–44.
279. Dale, 530 U.S. at 661.
280. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 656.
281. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 561.
282. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 557.
283. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 774–75.
284. Hurley, 515 U.S. 572–73.
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For-profit businesses, like the one in our hypothetical, are not discrete
associations, as they are open to the public for the sale of goods or services,
and thus, they must comply with antidiscrimination laws.285 However, an
employer may argue that the hiring, paying, and promotion of employees is
not relevant to the service to the public at large. If our hypothetical entity
does not refuse to provide photography services to the LGBTQIA commu-
nity, Ward Photography may argue they have not violated any antidis-
crimination law. Rather, they can contend that their employees are
representatives of the business, and that employers are permitted to disci-
pline and terminate employees who do not serve the employer’s mission.
Further, the studio in our hypothetical might argue that by retaining Sam,
they are forced to associate with a DSD or transgender person—an idea that
directly conflicts with their stated religious beliefs. If Dale and Hurley were
applied to the employment context, Supreme Court precedent would pro-
tect an employer’s explicit discrimination on freedom of association and
compulsory speech grounds.
B. An Employer’s Statutory Right to Discriminate
In addition to potential constitutional protections, employers also
benefit from statutorily-created defenses to employment discrimination,
which are particularly concerning to the LGBTQIA community. These de-
fenses purport to protect religious freedoms, and are present under both
state and federal RFRA laws. Generally speaking, these laws broaden a per-
son’s religious freedom rights beyond the protections afforded under the
First Amendment. We have addressed the federal RFRA throughout this
Article in the context of both Supreme Court jurisprudence and recent fed-
eral court decisions. We now turn to a slightly more focused examination of
the parameters of a RFRA-type defense.
1. Right to Discriminate under RFRA
As discussed in Section II.B.2 above, federal RFRA laws prohibit the
government from substantially burdening a person’s exercise of religion.
Several states have adopted similar, and in some cases more expansive,
285. Whether and to what extent all services provided to the public are considered public
accommodations, as opposed to only those services that are considered essential,
could be the significant factor in determining whether a business must comply with
all antidiscrimination laws, even where doing so would violate the religious beliefs of
the owners with respect to sexual orientation and transgender rights. See Gottry supra
note 277, at 1003.
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versions of RFRA.286 For example, some state RFRA laws impose a lower
standard than a “substantial burden” on religion in order to trigger strict
scrutiny.287 As a result, any time a law burdens a religious belief in any
sense, the law must withstand exacting judicial scrutiny to be upheld.288
Arguably, those state RFRA laws that provide more religious protections—
and thereby allow more discrimination against suspect classes—are uncon-
stitutional in light of Romer v. Evans.289 In Romer, the Supreme Court inval-
idated a Colorado state constitutional amendment denying homosexuals
certain protections from discrimination.290 Legal scholars have debated
whether state religious accommodation laws could be used by closely-held,
religiously-minded employers to discriminate against both their own em-
ployees, as well as members of the general public who oppose their gender
identity and sexual orientation.291 Depending on the state law at issue, em-
ployers may have a strong argument that such discrimination is legal.
The mechanism through which employers may take adverse actions
against their LGBTQIA employees is most explicit in Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., as discussed in Section IV.A.1.292 In Hobby Lobby, female
employees challenged the company’s refusal to pay for health coverage as
required by the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) on gender discrimination
286. Twenty-one states have enacted such legislation: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Con-
necticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. See State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Oct. 15, 2015, http://www.ncsl.org/re-
search/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx.
287. See Jason Goldman, Note, Religious Freedom: Why States Are Unconstitutionally Bur-
dening Their Own Citizens as They “Lower” Burden, 2015 CARDOZO L. REV. DE
NOVO 57, 68–70 (2015) (identifying states, including Pennsylvania and Texas,
which appear to use lower standards in their own statutory or constitutional free
exercise protections). See also Michael T. Zugelder, Toward Equal Rights for LGBT
Employees: Legal & Managerial Implications for Employers, 43 OHIO N. U. L. REV.,
193, 207–08 (2017) (discussing discriminatory effects of states’ “little” RFRA laws).
288. Id.
289. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
290. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635. See also Mark Joseph Stern, North Carolina’s New Anti-
LGBTQ Law is Vicious, Shameful, & Unconstitutional, SLATE: OUTWARD, Mar. 24,
2016, http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2016/03/24/north_carolina_s_anti_
lgbtq_law_is_unconstitutional.html (analyzing unconstitutionality of North Caro-
lina bill in light of court’s decision in Romer, 517 U.S. at 635).
291. See, e.g., Nelson Tebbe, Religion & Marriage Equality Statutes, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 25, 26 (2015) (discussing religious accommodations for those who oppose
same sex marriages on religious grounds in a variety of contexts including
employment).
292. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
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grounds.293 The Hobby Lobby Court noted that courts must “take adequate
account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on
nonbeneficiaries,” such as the burdens imposed by the employer’s religious
convictions.294 The Court noted that harms to third parties—here, the fe-
male employees who are affected by the religious belief—“will often inform
the analysis of the Government’s compelling interest and the availability of a
less restrictive means of advancing that interest.”295 However, the Court
noted that no third-party harms existed in the Hobby Lobby case296 and
“appear[ed] to cast doubt on the third party harm doctrine.”297 Legal schol-
ars have urged courts to treat this language as pure dicta and ensure that
third-party harms are considered.298
The next step in the Hobby Lobby Court’s analysis of whether a law
that impacted an entity’s religious beliefs was warranted—and thus consti-
tutional—was whether the government’s law served a compelling interest.299
The Court assumed, without evaluating the proposition, that providing
contraceptives is a compelling governmental interest.300 But the Court went
on to note that the government must show that the burden on Hobby
Lobby’s exercise of religion is the least restrictive way to accomplish the
compelling interest.301
In her dissent, Justice Ginsberg questioned whether the Court would
reach the same outcome if a corporation were to have a sincerely held relig-
293. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct at 2759 (although the company-employer provided coverage
for birth control, it refused to provide coverage for a certain drug which it deemed
was tantamount to an abortion and an issue with which the company had religious
objections).
294. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37 (noting that courts analyze the religious ex-
emption claims to “take adequate account of the burdens a requested accommoda-
tion may impose on nonbeneficiaries” (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709,
720 (2005))). See also Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709–11
(1985) (holding state law that allowed employees the unfettered right to dictate
when they could work based on religious grounds violated the Establishment Clause
as it did not consider the effects on employer and other employees).
295. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37.
296. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2760.
297. Tebbe, supra note 291, at 53 n.129.
298. See Tebbe, supra note 291, at 53. See also Jennifer A. Marshall, Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby: Protecting Religious Freedom Diverse Society, 10 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 327,
332 (2016) (“The Hobby Lobby opinion itself articulated the case-specific nature of
its analysis”).
299. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779.
300. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780.
301. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780.
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ious belief that women should not receive equal pay to men.302 The major-
ity countered her argument, stating:
[O]ur holding is very specific. We do not hold . . . that for-profit
corporations and other commercial enterprises can ‘opt out of
any law (saving only tax laws) they judge incompatible with their
sincerely held religious beliefs.’ . . . Nor do we hold . . . that such
corporations have free rein to take steps that impose ‘disadvan-
tages . . . on others’. . . .303
The majority further noted:
The principal dissent raises the possibility that discrimination in
hiring, for example on the basis of race, might be cloaked as
religious practice to escape legal sanction. . . . Our decision to-
day provides no such shield. The Government has a compelling
interest in providing an equal opportunity to participate in the
workforce without regard to race, and prohibitions on racial dis-
crimination are precisely tailored to achieve that critical goal.304
Despite these assurances, the question remains whether the LGBTQIA
community as a class would be protected in the same way as women or
racial minorities. After Hobby Lobby, organizations continue to challenge
the ACA’s contraceptive mandate on RFRA grounds.305 They allege that,
even though they are now allowed to opt-out of providing coverage by noti-
fying the government of their religious objections, they still feel complicit in
the promotion of abortion-inducing drugs, because the employee’s health
coverage costs have merely shifted to a third-party—an outside insurance
provider.306 Courts have generally concluded that sending a notification to
302. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2802 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Dole v. Shenan-
doah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1392 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding head of house-
hold supplemental pay for teachers violated the Fair Labor Standards Act minimum
wage despite the church’s argument that its application violated their free exercise
beliefs)). The Court found limited burden on the church’s beliefs because the Bible
does not mandate a pay differential based on sex. Id. at 1397. Increased payroll
expenses are not a burden that is determinative in a free exercise claim. Id. at 1398.
303. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2760.
304. Hobby Lobby, 135 S. Ct. at 2783.
305. E.g., Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1560 (2016) (per curiam).
306. See Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at 1560. See, e.g., Cath. Health Care Sys. v. Burwell, 796 F.3d
207, 217 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting plaintiffs’ argument that “by submitting the opt-
out notification . . . they are indirectly facilitating the provision to their employees of
products and services that have contraceptive and ‘abortion-inducing’ effects”), va-
cated, 136 S. Ct. 2450 (2016). See also Frederick Mark Gedicks, “Substantial” Bur-
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the government that one is eligible for an exemption to the ACA is not a
substantial burden despite any sincerely held religious beliefs.307 However,
in Zubik v. Burwell, the Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts’
analysis and vacated and remanded these cases.308 The Supreme Court held
the circuit courts should find an accommodation to the non-profit religious
entities’ religious exercise “while at the same time ensuring that women cov-
ered by petitioner’s health plans ‘receive full and equal health coverage, in-
cluding contraceptive coverage.’”309 The Court implicitly found that by
requiring religious entities to draft insurance plan documents that covered
these contraceptives (so the entity itself did not provide them) is still a sub-
stantial burden on their religious beliefs.310
Despite the breadth of Hobby Lobby and Zubik, RFRA does not pro-
tect private businesses from engaging in discriminatory behavior where there
is a compelling interest in eradicating a particular form of discrimination,
such as racial discrimination.311 For example, schools are prohibited from
engaging in racial segregation—even if the school claims a religious opposi-
tion to interracial relationships: “the Government has a fundamental, over-
riding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education . . . [that]
outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on [the schools’]
exercise of their religious beliefs . . . and no less restrictive means . . . are
available to achieve the governmental interest.”312
Likewise, religious employers cannot argue that RFRA permits them
to discriminate against women because eliminating sex discrimination is a
compelling interest.313 The question remains, however, whether the
dens: How Courts May (And Why They Must) Judge Burdens on Religion Under RFRA,
85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 94, 128–29 (2017) (discussing Zubik’s remand order and
the theory that the Supreme Court remanded in anticipation of the parties reaching
a settlement).
307. See Velte, supra note 20.
308. Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at 1560.
309. Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at 1560.
310. See Mark L. Rienzi, Fool Me Twice: Zubik v. Burwell & Perils Judicial Faith Govern-
ment Claims, 2016 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 123, 130–31 (2016) (noting the govern-
ment conceded its interests are furthered so long as women have some form of
contraceptive coverage, not necessarily all forms of contraceptive coverage, and that
this could be accomplished without the entities’ drafting documents violating their
faith). See also Gedicks, supra note 306 at 133–35 (discussing courts’ need to review
whether the law truly places a “substantial” burden on religious beliefs).
311. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774. This same rationale is used when businesses con-
tend laws violate religious beliefs under the Free Exercise Clause. Id.
312. Bob Jones U. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (citations and quotations
omitted).
313. See, e.g., Redhead v. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 440 F. Supp. 2d 211, 221–22
(E.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding RFRA inapplicable where religious school violated Title
VII by firing female teacher for becoming pregnant outside of marriage); see also
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LGBTQIA community (and transgender or DSD persons in particular) is
protected from sex discrimination.314 Whether these employers can discrim-
inate for reasons “other than sex,” is an ongoing question, as evidenced by
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral
Homes, which we initially discussed in Section II.B.2 above.
In R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, the court determined that the
funeral home had stated a valid RFRA defense as it had a sincerely held
religious belief: “The Bible teaches that a person’s sex (whether male or
female) is an immutable God-given gift and that it is wrong for a person to
deny his or her God-given sex.”315 The court determined that Title VII and
the body of sex-stereotyping case law place a substantial burden on the fu-
neral home’s ability to carry out its business in accordance with its religious
beliefs.316 Additionally, the court determined that the EEOC failed to
demonstrate its two-part burden: that (1) it had a compelling interest in
prohibiting the funeral home’s dress policy, and (2) the law was the least
restrictive means of furthering that interest with respect to the funeral
home.317 The court assumed, without deciding, that eradicating gender-
based stereotyping in the workplace was a compelling interest, but disagreed
with the EEOC’s argument that this interest was furthered solely by al-
lowing employees to wear clothing commensurate with the gender with
which they identify.318 Accordingly, the court determined the funeral
home’s RFRA defense to the Title VII gender-based stereotyping claim was
valid.319 However, the case is now on appeal and the terminated funeral
director has joined the suit, which places into question whether RFRA can
be used as a viable defense.320
In those instances where an employer with sincerely-held religious be-
liefs demonstrates that its mission is hindered by employing an LGBTQIA
United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 238 (1992) (noting “[i]t is beyond question
that discrimination in employment on the basis of sex, race, or any of the other
classifications protected by Title VII is. . . . an invidious practice that causes grave
harm to its victims”).
314. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774 (finding no cause to determine the scope of
RFRA outside the facts of the case).
315. EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 201 F. Supp. 3d 837, 855 (E.D.
Mich. 2016).
316. Harris Funeral Homes, 201 F. Supp. 3d. at 855.
317. Harris Funeral Homes, 201 F. Supp. 3d. at 859–60.
318. Harris Funeral Homes, 201 F. Supp. 3d. at 861–62 (noting the EEOC’s position is
that the funeral director should be permitted to dress in a stereotypical female man-
ner that does not eliminate gender-based stereotyping as opposed to a gender-neutral
clothing policy).
319. Harris Funeral Homes, 201 F. Supp. 3d. at 862–63.
320. Response Brief of Appellee R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 2017 WL
2222848, *37–38 (6th Cir. May 17, 2017).
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person, RFRA could be an affirmative defense to the enforcement of federal
legislation like the EPA or Title VII. However, as addressed in Section 2, the
Supreme Court has not expressly concluded that the federal RFRA law is an
available defense in private litigation. To the extent that it is not, employers
would need to argue a defense under a broader state RFRA law or the First
Amendment.
2. Federal RFRA as a Defense in Purely Private Litigation
A current controversy exists regarding whether federal RFRA can be
used as a defense in private litigation. In particular, there is a question about
whether RFRA is a defense to employment discrimination where an indi-
vidual, rather than the EEOC, is the plaintiff.321 RFRA section 2000bb-1(c)
states: “[a] person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of
this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial
proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government.”322 The lan-
guage “and obtain appropriate relief” implies that the defense is only appli-
cable if the case involves the government.323 However, the phrase “claim or
defend in a judicial proceeding” could be interpreted as extending the right
of a plaintiff to use it as a defense (or a claim) to any proceeding, not just
those that involve the government.324 A literal reading of the language re-
flects that the statute was designed to apply when the government is a party
to a suit (e.g. that the government bears a burden of proof to demonstrate
its compelling interest, etc.).325 However, this does not necessarily negate
the clear statutory language that allows a litigant to raise RFRA as a defense
in other proceedings.326
The majority of courts addressing the issue of whether defendants in
lawsuits brought by nongovernmental entities may use RFRA as a defense
have found that they may not.327 Justice Sotomayor, while on the Second
321. Response Brief of Appellee R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., supra note
146, at *34–35.
322. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1(c) (Westlaw through P.L. 115-90). See also Sara Lunsford
Kohen, Religious Freedom Private Lawsuits: Untangling When RFRA Applies to Suits
Involving Only Private Parties, 10 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 43, 45
(2011) (collecting conflicting decisions and advocating for use of RFRA defense in
all litigation).




327. See EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 837, 864
(E.D. Mich. 2016). See also Gen. Conf. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill,
617 F.3d 402, 410–12 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that RFRA does not apply in suits
between private parties); Mathis v. Christian Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 158
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Circuit Court of Appeals, dissented in a RFRA case, Hankins v. Lyght, ex-
plaining that RFRA defenses are only available when the government is
bringing the suit, not when the suit is between private parties.328 Justice
Sotomayor reasoned that where the government is not a party to the suit, it
cannot “go[ ] forward” with evidence to prosecute or defend its case.329
Nonetheless, she “recognize[d] that according to RFRA’s “applicability” sec-
tion, the statute applies “to all Federal law.”330 This suggests that RFRA
defenses ought to be available whenever a federal law is at issue—even when
the government is not actually a party.331 This issue was discussed in General
Conference Corporation of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, where the 6th
Circuit noted:
[C]ongress repeatedly referred to government action in the find-
ings and purposes sections of RFRA. Congress found that “gov-
ernments should not substantially burden religious exercise
without compelling justification,” that the pre-Smith regime had
required that “the government justify burdens on religious exer-
cise,” and that strict scrutiny was necessary for “striking sensible
balances between religious liberty and competing prior govern-
mental interests.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a) (emphasis added).
Congress described RFRA’s purpose as “to provide a claim or
defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially bur-
dened by government.” § 2000bb(b) (emphasis added).332
Ultimately, in Hankins v. Lyght, the Court determined that RFRA applied
to any action wherein a federal statute “substantially burden[ed] . . . exercise
of religion.”333 In Hankins, the plaintiff sought relief under the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), as he had been forced to re-
tire.334 Because both the plaintiff and the EEOC could have brought suit,
F. Supp. 3d 317, 326 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (agreeing with the majority interpretation that
RFRA only applies to suits in which the government is a party); Sutton v. Providence
St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 834 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the plaintiff
cannot state a valid claim under RFRA against the defendant, a private employer, in
the circumstances presented). But see Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 692 n.2 (7th
Cir. 2013) (noting apparent conflict among courts).
328. See Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96, 114–15 (2d Cir. 2006) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
329. Hankins, 441 F.3d at 114.
330. Hankins, 441 F.3d at 115.
331. Hankins, 441 F.3d at 115.
332. Gen. Conf. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402, 411 (6th
Cir. 2010).
333. Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96, 103–04 (2d Cir. 2006).
334. Hankins, 441 F.3d at 99.
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the court noted it would be discordant to allow the employer to assert a
RFRA defense when sued by the government, but not when sued by a pri-
vate plaintiff.335 Accordingly, whether employers can use RFRA as a defense
in private litigation is not settled.336 But even if an employer is precluded
from using RFRA as a defense in a private action, both the EPA and Title
VII provide ample affirmative defenses to employers that would permit con-
tinued discrimination against the LGBTQIA community.
CONCLUSION
Despite federal and state antidiscrimination laws, many individuals re-
main unprotected because of a narrow and outdated interpretation of the
word “sex.” We have explored how these laws unnecessarily restrict a per-
son’s right to equal employment and enable employers to use anachronistic
reasoning to disadvantage an entire population. And we have demonstrated
the need for both judicial and congressional action to broaden the defini-
tion of “sex” and “sex discrimination” to include the LGBTQIA
community.
Turning back to our hypothetical, let’s imagine that Sam sues Ward
Photography for both wage discrimination under the EPA and gender-based
stereotyping under Title VII. Clearly, Sam will face several substantial ob-
stacles, not the least of which is who would be considered Sam’s “opposite
sex” comparator for an EPA claim.337 Even if Sam is able to identify a com-
parator, Ward Photography may argue that it paid Sam differently based on
a “factor other than sex.” Because of the uncertainty surrounding whether
the “other factor” can literally be any other factor, Ward Photography may
335. Hankins, 441 F.3d at 103. However, another panel within the Second Circuit has
since questioned whether the Hankins’ ruling regarding RFRA and private parties
was accurate. See Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 203–04 (2d Cir. 2008). The
court noted: “we think the text of RFRA is plain,” and RFRA is inapplicable to
purely private disputes ”regardless of whether the government is capable of enforcing
the statute at issue.” Id. at 203 n.2. Accord, Tomic v. Cath. Diocese of Peoria, 442
F.3d 1036, 1042 (7th Cir. 2006) (discounting Hankins and finding “RFRA is appli-
cable only to suits to which the government is a party”), abrogated on other grounds by
Hosanna–Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171
(2012); Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 834, 837–43 (9th
Cir. 1999) (noting RFRA does not state that it specifically applies to nongovernmen-
tal actors).
336. See Stephens, supra note 241, at 41.
337. If the hypothetical were altered slightly and Sam is employed in a state with antidis-
crimination in pay laws, and the employer were accepting of the LGBTQIA commu-
nity—the employer that raises Sam’s salary could likewise subject itself to a reverse
discrimination claim. In this regard, the employer should establish evidence (taken
from the plethora of evidence) that the LGBTQIA community has historically been,
and continues to be, the subject of discrimination.
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be successful in contending a variety of defenses, e.g. moral, legal, religious
objections to recognizing a person as intersex, etc.338 If the studio were to
terminate Sam upon disclosure of their intersex birth certificate, the studio
could argue that their action complies with exemptions found within
RFRA, as well as the First Amendment and the ministerial exemption of
Title VII.
The tandem reading of Hobby Lobby and Hosanna-Tabor cases demon-
strates that closely-held entities with religious owners engaged in a for-profit
business (with an underlying faith-based mission), may contend that em-
ployees must conform to the employer’s religious and moral beliefs. When
the employees fail to do so, they can be terminated.
To combat this blatant discrimination, the proposed federal Equality
Act would amend Title VII to specifically include sex, sexual orientation,
and gender identity as a protected class, and would expand the definition of
places that are considered “public accommodations.”339 This is a good step,
but the Equality Act may not go far enough, as it does not eliminate or limit
the ministerial exemption and does not define the term “sex” as it applies in
other statutes, like the EPA.340 To fully ensure equality, Congress must nar-
row the entities who can claim a religious exemption and the situations in
which such exemptions may be invoked. Congress must also update the
Dictionary Act to include a more progressive and inclusive definition of sex.
Without judicial and legislative clarity, an entire community will remain
unprotected. This has deep moral implications and would lead to an ineffi-
cient, unequal workforce.
338. Should a defendant succeed in carrying this burden, a plaintiff may then “counter
the employer’s affirmative defense by producing evidence that the reasons the defen-
dant seeks to advance are actually a pretext for sex discrimination.” Belfi v. Prender-
gast, 191 F.3d 129, 136 (E.D. N.Y. 2016) (finding valid EPA claim, as plaintiff was
paid less than men and the stated reasons may have been pretext). But see Allen
Smith, EEO-1 Pay Reporting, Overtime Rule May Be Repealed Following Trump Order,
SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., Mar. 20, 2017, https://www.shrm.org/resources
andtools/legal-and-compliance/employment-law/pages/eeo-1-overtime-repeal.
339. See Why the Equality Act? HUMAN RIGHTS CAMP., https://www.hrc.org/resources/
why-the-equality-act (last visited Feb. 4, 2018). See also EQUALITY ACT OF 2017, S.
1006, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017) (specifically identifying that sex discrimination
includes sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, or pregnancy, childbirth, or a re-
lated medical condition or an individual, as well as because of sex-based stereotypes).
340. Equality Act of 2017, S. 1006, 115th Cong. (2017) (referred to Senate Committee
on the Judiciary on May 2, 2017).
